Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Dissertations
Summer 6-12-2013

Organ Donation, Trust and Reciprocity
Danyang Li
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss

Recommended Citation
Li, Danyang, "Organ Donation, Trust and Reciprocity." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2013.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/4329116

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Economics Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia
State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

PERMISSION TO BORROW

In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced
degree from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall
make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations
governing materials of this type. I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or
to publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his or her absence, the
professor under whose direction it was written or, in his or her absence, by the Dean of
the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Such quoting, copying, or publishing must
be solely for scholarly purposes and must not involve potential financial gain. It is
understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves
potential gain will not be allowed without written permission of the author.

______________________________
Signature of the Author

NOTICE TO BORROWERS
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement.
The author of this dissertation is:
Danyang Li
400 17th Street NW Unit 1306
Atlanta, GA 30363
The director of this dissertation is:
Dr. James C. Cox
Experimental Economics Center
Georgia State University
P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
Users of this dissertation not regularly enrolled as students at Georgia State University
are required to attest acceptance of the preceding stipulations by signing below. Libraries
borrowing this dissertation for the use of their patrons are required to see that each user
records here the information requested.
Name of User

Address

Date

Type of use
(Examination only or copying)

ORGAN DONATION, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY
BY
DANYANG LI

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
2013

Copyright
Danyang Li
2013

ACCEPTANCE
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s Dissertation
Committee. It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it
has been accepted in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Economics in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia
State University.

Dissertation Chair:

Dr. James C. Cox

Committee:

Dr. Kurt E. Schnier
Dr. Vjollca Sadiraj
Dr. Cary A. Deck

Electronic Version Approved:
Mary Beth Walker, Dean
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
August 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am able to finish this dissertation only because of the support of many teachers,
friends, and my dear parents.
First, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my adviser Dr. James Cox,
who provided wonderful guidance helping find my own path for successful research. He
was always there when I needed support. He is, without question, the most influential
person who guides my research thinking.
I thank Dr. Kurt Schiner for his unlimited support and encouragement. He is my
professor turned coauthor and mentor. He has taught me so much in this process as he is
my second chair. I look forward to many more years of co-authorship with him.
I thank Dr. Vjollca Sadiraj and Dr. Cary Deck, who were also instrumental in the
completion of this dissertation. I greatly appreciate all their helpful comments and
assistance they provided on my research.
I was lucky to know a group of great people during my graduate program. I want
to thank Fernando Rios Avila for the many great comments on my research work, Juan
Sun and Juan Jose Miranda Montero for the best library time, and Guanlin Gao for all the
support and encouragement.
I am deeply thankful for the friendship of Ziyue Chen, Bob Shih, He Gong,
Haidong Xue, Chao Li, Fei Song, You Zhuo, James Cheng, and Jerry Cheng. I want to
thank them for helping me go through the hardest time of my life.
I want to thank Zackary Hawley in particular. Zack helped me realize that I have
the potential to achieve many triumphs. He was there to encourage me when I was down.
I also want to thank Larry and Marie Hawley, who have been treating me like a family
member.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my dear parents. I appreciate
so much their sacrifices to support my education throughout my life. I want to deeply
thank them for the love and support they always give me. I am who I am because of
them.

iv

CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... ix
Chapter I: Do I Care if You Know I Betrayed You? .......................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Some Related Literature ................................................................................................. 2
Experimental Design and Protocol ................................................................................. 5
Results ............................................................................................................................. 9
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 12
Chapter II: Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default Choice or Allocation
........................................................................................................................................... 14
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 14
Behavioral Hypotheses ................................................................................................. 22
Experimental Design ..................................................................................................... 25
Results ........................................................................................................................... 32
Robustness of Results ................................................................................................ 44
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 45
Chapter III: Improving the Approach to Organ Donor Registration ................................ 48
v

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 48
Experimental Design ..................................................................................................... 53
Results ........................................................................................................................... 57
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 64
Appendix A: Instructions for Chapter I Experiment......................................................... 67
Appendix B: Parametric Tests of Chapter II Experiment ................................................. 75
Appendix C: Instructions for Chapter II Experiment ....................................................... 77
Appendix D: Instructions for Chapter III Experiment ...................................................... 86
References ......................................................................................................................... 89

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Frequencies of the Choice to Defect by Treatment ............................................ 10
Table 2. Probit Regressions of the Choice to Defect ........................................................ 11
Table 3. Two-by-Two Experimental Design .................................................................... 22
Table 4. Number of Sessions for Each Treatment Combination ...................................... 32
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment ........................................................... 33
Table 6. Wilcoxon Rank-sum Tests .................................................................................. 35
Table 7. Probit Regressions on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment
........................................................................................................................................... 36
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment ........................................................... 58
Table 9. Percent Choosing to be a Donor within the Experiment .................................... 59
Table 10. Probit Regression on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment
........................................................................................................................................... 61

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The Modified Trust Game ................................................................................... 6
Figure 2. Decision Screen for Trustees in Treatment 2 ...................................................... 8
Figure 3. Illustration of the Decision Screen Used in the Experiment ............................. 27
Figure 4. Percent of Donors in Each Treatment Reported by Round of the Experiment . 34
Figure 5. Screenshot of the Experimental Program .......................................................... 54
Figure 6. Simulations Payoff Difference between Being a Donor and a Non-donor ....... 75

viii

ABSTRACT
ORGAN DONATION, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY
BY
DANYANG LI
MAY, 2013
Committee Chair:

Dr. James C. Cox

Major Department:

Economics

This dissertation consists of three chapters that focus on topics in fields of
experimental economics and health economics.
The first chapter, “Do I Care if You Know I Betrayed You?” , examines how
concern for others’ disutility from betrayal can affect the decision to repay trust in the
trust game. We use a laboratory experiment to compare trustees’ behavior when betrayal
is obfuscated to an identical monetary payoffs situation where betrayal is revealed. We
find that more trustees choose to defect in our experiment when betrayal is obfuscated
than when it is revealed. Our result suggests that concern for betrayal costs influences
not only the decision to trust but also the decision to repay trust.
The second chapter, “Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default
Choice or Allocation Rule”, utilizes a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness
of alternative public policies targeted at increasing the rate of deceased donor organ
donation. The experiment includes treatments across different default choices and organ
allocation rules inspired by the donor registration systems applied in different countries.
Our results indicate that the opt-out with priority rule system generates the largest
ix

increase in organ donation relative to an opt-in only program. However, sizeable gains
are achievable using either a priority rule or opt-out program separately, with the opt-out
rule generating approximately 80% of the benefits achieved under a priority rule
program.
The third chapter, “Improving the Approach to Organ Donor Registration”,
proposes to improve organ donor registry by providing a persuasive message with the
registration request. I designed a laboratory experiment to examine the impact of the
persuasive message on donation decisions. The results indicate that the persuasive
message has a positive impact on donation decisions in the early rounds of the
experiment. Subjects were about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1
of the experiment when they were provided with a persuasive message. This behavioral
difference across treatment decreased as subjects played more rounds, since subjects in
the control treatment learned the information in the persuasive message through playing
the game. We further find this treatment effect is mainly from subjects who are not organ
donors in real life, while the treatment effect is very small for those who are self-reported
organ donors.

x
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Chapter I: Do I Care if You Know I Betrayed You?

Introduction
People often are generous both in everyday life and in experiments. This
behavior has been often interpreted a preference for generous outcomes. However, recent
literature indicates that people may not really value the social outcome, they may instead,
just want to be seen as being generous. In a study by Güth et al. (1996), the authors
modify the standard ultimatum game by varying the size of the cake, which can take
either a large or a small value. Only the proposer knows the true size of the cake. They
find that many proposers with a large cake offer the equal split of a small cake. The
authors refer to this behavior as “hiding behind some small cake.”
We extend the literature by looking at the decision to cooperate in a trust game.
We modified the trust game so that subjects can “hide behind a coin flip.” In our
modified trust game, the first mover’s (or “trustor’s”) decision to trust the second mover
(or “trustee”) is “productive” (Deck 2009), which refers to the increase in total money
payoff compared with the alternative choice.1 We introduced a move of nature in
between the trustor’s decision and the trustee’s decision, which randomly determines the
productivity level of trust. This move of nature is determined by a coin flip. The trustor
does not observe nature’s move or the trustee’s decision unless they are revealed by his
own payoff. The key feature of the modified trust game is that when the trustee repays

1

Henceforth, we use the common, although questionable, designation of the first mover as “trustor” and the
second mover as “trustee” even though the first mover’s motivation may be trust or altruism, or both (Cox
2004).
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low-productivity trust, the trustor receives the same payoff as when the trustee betrays
high-productivity trust. That is, the trustor cannot infer betrayal of high-productivity
trust.
We recruited subjects to participate in two experimental treatments. Subjects play
the modified trust game in treatment 1. In treatment 2, different subjects play a game
identical to the modified trust game except that the trustor observes nature’s move at the
end of the game, hence the trustor eventually has perfect information about the trustee’s
decision. We find that subjects repay high-productivity trust more frequently in
treatment 2 than in treatment 1. Results of the experiment show that people are more
selfish when they can “hide behide a coin flip.” Our findings are consistent with the prior
findings that people may not really value the social outcome of cooperation, they may
instead, just want to pretend to be cooperative.
The next section of the paper describes some related literature. Section 3
describes the experimental design and protocol. Section 4 reports the results from the
experiment. The final section of the paper concludes.

Some Related Literature
Traditional economic models assume that individuals’ actions are exclusively
motivated by material self-interest. The narrow material self-interest assumption is quite
good at predicting behavior in many contexts. However, in some contexts, this
assumption does not work well. Examples include ultimatum games (Güth et al. 1982;
Slonim and Roth 1998), dictator games (Forsythe et al. 1994; Andreoni and Miller 2002),
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and investment games (Berg et al. 1995; Cox 2004; Cox and Deck 2005). Experimental
studies of such games show that individuals often behave in a way that is inconsistent
with narrow material self-interest.
As a result of these findings, researchers have been motivated to develop models
of other-regarding preferences. These models assume individuals have genuine concern
for others’ material payoffs. This literature broadly falls into two classes: outcome-based
models and models of reciprocity. The outcome-based (distributional) models assume
that individuals care about their own and others’ material payoffs. Examples include
inequality aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasimaximin models (Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004), convex
other-regarding preferences models (Andreoni and Miller 2002), and the egocentric
altruism model (Cox and Sadiraj 2007; 2012). Alternatively, models of reciprocity
assume that individuals prefer to repay kind actions by others with similar actions
themselves and, also, to repay unkind actions with similarly unkind ones. For example,
revealed altruism theory (Cox et al. 2008) assumes that one person’s generous action may
change another person’s preferences and trigger a reciprocal response.
A series of recent studies find that people often “pretend to be generous”, but do
not truly value the generous outcome. In a two-level ultimatum game experiment, Güth
et al. (1996) find that subjects are more selfish when they can hide their selfish behavior
“behind some small cake.” In a dictator experiment by Dana et al. (2007), dictators are
more likely to be selfish when they can stay ignorant of the recipients’ payoffs. The
related work by Dana et al. (2006) also shows that many subjects are willing to pay to
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avoid the dictator decision. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) further find that
communication could affect behavior by influencing beliefs about others’ beliefs. In the
study by Hamman et al. (2010), the authors find that subjects are more selfish when they
can delegate their selfish actions to agents (a third party).
Our work focuses on people’s decision to cooperate in a trust game. We modified
the trust game by introducing a random coin flip, which determines the productivity of
trust. In one treatment, only trustees can observe the realized outcome of the coin flip, so
that they can hide their selfish actions “behind the coin flip.” In another treatment, the
realized outcome of the coin flip is common knowledge between trustors and trustees.
We find that fewer subjects cooperate when betrayal is obfuscated from their partners.
This finding cannot be explained by any of the above-cited outcome-based
models. Trustees with preferences consistent with those models should behave
consistently across our treatments because the feasible sets of material payoff alternatives
are identical across treatments. Also, revealed altruism theory cannot be applied here
without modification because opportunity sets in our modified trust game are not
exclusively chosen by other (human) players.
In a context of the trust game, trustors can display an aversion to betrayal. The
idea of betrayal aversion has been addressed by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). They
experiment with subjects’ decision making in paired trust games played either with
another person or a computer. They find that individuals are less willing to “trust” when
the outcome is determined by another person than when it is determined by random draw

5

by a computer. This result indicates an aversion to being betrayed by another human
being, which is referred to as “betrayal aversion” by Bohnet and Zeckhauser. Bohnet et
al. (2008) follow the same design to examine whether betrayal aversion is a robust
feature beyond the United States. Their results support betrayal aversion as a broadbased phenomenon across countries.
We follow this finding and look inversely at the behavior to repay trust. Since
betrayal aversion exists, trustees may feel obliged to cooperate, but may not really value
the outcome generated from cooperation. This possibly explains our finding that some
subjects only cooperate when their actions are revealed, since they just want to appear to
be cooperative, but do not have true concerns for others’ payoffs.
Our findings can fit into the literature of the “hiding behind some small cake” —
behavior (Güth et al. 1996). This result is consistent with previous findings that people
are more selfish when their behavior is not revealed. We are not denying that the
behavior to repay trust may be motivated by distributional concerns or reciprocity.
However, this possibility may be overstated by results of prior research. Our work
suggests a complementary explanation. Our results suggest that sometimes trustees who
repay trust may just pretend to be cooperative.

Experimental Design and Protocol
We modified the trust game introduced by McCabe and Smith (2000) in our
experiment. In the trust game, the first movers who trusts is willing to take the risk of
losing a certain amount by engaging into the game, anticipating cooperation from the
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second mover. The second mover who is reciprocal responds to the first mover’s trust by
cooperation, which results in a mutually beneficial outcome. The extensive form of the
modified trust game is represented in Figure 1. A first mover (the trustor) can choose a
sure option (“exit” the game) that gives both movers a payoff of 10, or he can choose to
trust (or “engage” into the game). The productivity level of trust is determined by
nature’s move.2 Fifty percent of the time, nature moves left and yields low-productivity
trust. In this case, trust increases the total money payoff from 20 to 30. Another fifty
percent of the time, nature moves right which selects high-productivity trust that
increases the total money payoff from 20 to 50. After observing nature’s move, a second
mover (the trustee) has to choose between cooperate with the trust or defect. Cooperation
with low-productivity trust gives both movers a payoff of 15, while defecting results in a
payoff of 0 for the trustor and 30 for the trustee. Cooperating with high-productivity trust
ends with a payoff of 25 for both movers, while defecting yields a payoff of 15 for the
trustor and 35 for the trustee.

Figure 1. The Modified Trust Game

2

This design is based on Dufwenberg et al. (2001). In their experiment the authors varied the multiplier of
donations, which can either be 2 or 4.
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Interestingly, when the trustee chooses to cooperate with low-productivity trust,
the trustor receives the same payoff — a payoff of 15 — as when trust is highlyproductive but the trustee defects. The trustor knows neither the choice nor the payoff of
the trustee, unless they are revealed by his own payoff. The trustor also cannot observe
nature’s move. Imagine you are the trustor who receives a payoff of 15. You may want
to believe that the trustee chose to cooperate and encountered an unlucky move of nature.
However, it is also possible that you faced a greedy partner who relied on the presence of
nature’s move for obfuscation. Consequently, the trustee’s action is not revealed.
We experiment with two treatments: (1) the modified trust game; (2) a game
identical to the modified trust game except that the trustor observes nature’s move at the
end of the game. We compare data from these two treatments to capture the effect of the
concern for betrayal costs. Compared with treatment 2, the trustee in treatment 1 is able
to hide betrayal when trust is highly-productive. Since betrayal is not revealed, the
trustee may believe that the trustor does not experience betrayal costs. This belief may
allow the trustee to justify the choice to defect, and thereby lead to more self-interested
actions.
Before the experiment started, the experimenter read the instructions out loud to
the subjects. Whether or not betrayal would be revealed was made clear to all subjects.
After the experiment began, subjects were reminded of whether betrayal would be
revealed again on the decision screen. The actual decision screen for trustees in
treatment 2 is shown below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Decision Screen for Trustees in Treatment 2
In both treatments, we implemented the strategy method. This method allows us
to observe trustees’ choices for both possible moves of nature even when the trustor
chooses the sure option. In each treatment, trustors had to decide whether to trust. At the
same time, trustees chose to cooperate or defect for each of the possible moves of nature.
The earnings of each pair of subjects were determined by choices of both parties and
nature’s move. Trustees were informed that their choices were only determinative for the
final payoff if their paired trustors chose to trust.
After subjects finished making decisions in each treatment, the experimenter
flipped a coin to determine nature’s move in the presence of all of the subjects. The
difference between the two treatments in the information provided to the subjects was as
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follows. In treatment 2, all subjects were informed whether “Heads” on the coin flip
meant that nature moved left or right. In treatment 1, only trustees were informed
whether Heads corresponded to left or right for nature’s move.
We used a double-blind subject payment protocol in which subjects’ choices are
anonymous to both other subjects and the experimenter. This protocol is implemented by
first asking each subject to select one from a box full of identical, sealed envelopes. Each
envelope contains a key with a unique number. Subjects are asked to use these numbers
as their (only) identifiers in the experiment. At the end of the experiment, subjects exit
the lab individually and collect their earnings in private from a mailbox with a number
that corresponds to their key number. Payoffs are contained in sealed envelopes.
Subjects are asked to exit the building before opening their envelopes. While waiting for
pay envelopes to be filled with money and put in the mailboxes, subjects are asked to
complete a questionnaire on demographic characteristics. Subjects’ questionnaire
responses are linked with their decisions by their mailbox key numbers.

Results
Subjects who participated in the experiment were recruited from undergraduate
students at Georgia State University. A total of 142 subjects participated in the
experiment, 72 in treatment 1 and 70 in treatment 2. Subjects earned on average $22.61
(including a $5 show-up fee). There were 2 sessions in each treatment. The treatments
were implemented with a between-subjects design. Subjects were randomly assigned to
one role, either the trustor or the trustee. Each trustor was randomly paired with a trustee.
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In each session, subjects played the game only once. Results from the experiment are as
follows.
Table 1 reports the frequency of the choice to defect for each treatment. The
results are consistent with our hypothesis that subjects choose to defect more frequently
when betrayal is not revealed. When nature led to high-productivity trust, 29 out of 36
trustees in treatment 1 chose to defect, while 23 out of 35 trustees chose to defect in
treatment 2. This difference across treatments is weakly significant (z = 1.4122, p-value
= 0.0789). The observed difference across treatments provides some support for the
conjecture that concern for others’ betrayal costs is a motivation for choosing
cooperation.

Table 1. Frequencies of the Choice to Defect by Treatment
Low-productivity Trust
Sample Size
Obs Percent
SD

High-productivity Trust
Obs Percent
SD

Treatment 1

36

20

55.56

50.40

29

80.56

40.14

Treatment 2

35

22

62.86

49.02

23

65.71

48.16

Proportion test across treatment:
z-test (p-value)
Total

-0.6258 (0.7343)

1.4122 (0.0789)

Note: The null hypothesis: difference in behavior across two treatments = 0; the alternative hypothesis: difference in
behavior across two treatments>0.

When trust was with low productivity, the choice to defect was revealed in both
treatments. We did not observe a statistically significant difference in choice of defect
across treatments. In treatment 1, 20 out of 36 trustees chose to defect. In treatment 2,
22 out of 35 trustees chose to defect. The difference across treatments is not statistically
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significant (z = -0.6258, p-value = 0.7343). This finding of insignificant difference for
the (trustor-revealing) choices with low-productivity trust, together with the significant
difference for the (trustor-obscuring) choices with high-productivity trust, provides
further support for our conjecture that it is trustees’ concern for betrayal costs that
explains differences between behaviors across treatments.

Table 2. Probit Regressions of the Choice to Defect
Dependent variable: choice to defect
Low-productivity Trust
High-productivity Trust
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Treatment
0.131
0.098
-0.176*
-0.224**
(0.121)
(0.128)
(0.105)
(0.109)
Defect with high-productivity trust

0.333**
(0.130)

0.299**
(0.138)

Defect with low-productivity trust

0.267**
(0.109)

0.240**
(0.114)

Gender

-0.052
(0.121)

-0.009
(0.106)

Race

-0.211*
(0.120)

-0.119
(0.109)

Experience

-0.033
(0.148)

-0.172
(0.140)

Log Likelihood

-44.788

-43.230

-37.206

-35.984

Pseudo R2

0.0672

0.0997

0.0979

0.1275

71

71

71

71

N

Notes: The base treatment is treatment 1. Reporting marginal effects. Standard error in parentheses. ***significant at
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.

Table 2 presents a series of probit regressions on trustees’ decisions to defect. In
regressions (1) and (2), we analyze trustees’ decisions when trust is with low
productivity, while regressions (3) and (4) produce the anaylsis of trustees’ decisions
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with high-productivity trust. The right-hand side of the regressions first includes a
dummy variable “Treatment”, which is equal to one in treatment 2. Since trustees made
simultaneous decisions for each possible outcome of nature with the strategy method,
regressions under low-productivity trust have controls on trustees’ decisions for highproductivity trust and vice versa.
Regressions (1) and (3) indicate that trustees only behave differently across
treatments when trust is highly productive (variable “Treatment”). Trustees are 17.6%
less likely to defect in treatment 2 when trust is highly productive and the result is
statistically significant at 10% level. However, the treatment does not affect the
likelihood to defect when betrayal is revealed in both treatment (p-value = 0.284).
Regressions (2) and (4) include additional subject characteristic variables such as
“Gender” (female = 1), “Race” (black = 1), and “Experience” (having previous
experience in other experiments = 1). Again, we only see behavioral difference across
treatments when trust is highly-productive. The coeffient on variable “Treatment” in
regression (4) is negative and significant at 5% level, suggesting that trustees are 22%
less likely to defect in treatment 2. However, regression (2) indicates that when trust is
with low productivity, there is no treatment effect.

Conclusion
In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a
modified trust game design. This design allows us to examine whether subjects are more
selfish when they can hide their selfish actions “behind a coin flip.” In the modified trust
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game, we introduce a random coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees. The
realized outcome of coin flip determines the productivity of trust. By varying trustors’
ability to observe the realized outcome of coin flip, we allow trustees to be able to hide
betrayal in one treatment. We find a significant increase in the choice to defect when
trustees can hide betrayal, but no significant behavioral change when betrayal is revealed
in both treatments. By backward induction, it is rational for trustors to engage in our
experiment, with the frequencies of defect reported in the modified trust game. This
result supports our hypothesis that subjects may just pretend to be cooperative but do not
really value the outcome from cooperation. Our finding suggests that concern for
betrayal costs influences not only the decision to trust, but also the decision to repay trust.
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Chapter II: Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default Choice or
Allocation
Introduction
Between 2000 and 2009 the annual number of deceased organ donors within the
United States (U.S.) increased from 5,985 to 8,022 (Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients (SRTR) 2012). Although this represents a 34% increase in deceased donors, it
has not kept pace with the rapidly risen waiting list. During this same time interval the
number of patients waiting for an organ transplant has increased from 74,635 to 111,027
patients, a 49% increase (SRTR 2012). Both in absolute and relative terms there is an
ever-increasing gap between the number of deceased donor organs and those waiting for
a transplant.3 Despite the large need for transplantable organs, only 42.7% of residents in
the U.S. over the age of 18 are registered organ donors.4 Clearly, the current organ
supply system in the United States fails to produce an adequate supply to satisfy the
demand for transplantable organs and there is an increasing need to close this gap and
increase human welfare. In this paper we experimentally investigate whether or not
changes in the organ donation default choices as well as organ allocation rules can
effectively increase organ donation and facilitate the closing of this gap.
The experimental design is inspired by different donor registration and organ
allocation systems currently applied in other countries. The U.S. system serves as a
baseline for comparison where current donor registration is an opt-in program and the
3

It is worth noting that the reported deaths while in the waiting list per 1,000 patient years at risks has decreased from
104.6 in 2000 to 84.5 in 2009 (SRTR 2012). This is primarily due the advancements in care for these patients and not a
function of increased transplantation.
4
Based on the 2012 National Donor Designation Report Card by the Donate Life America at http://donatelife.net/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/DLA-Report-Card-2012-350781.pdf
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organ allocation system does not assign priority to those who are willing to be donors
themselves. We compare this institution to an opt-out donor registration system inspired
by the current system in Spain and Austria, an opt-in with a priority allocation rule
inspired by Israel and an opt-out with priority rule system inspired by Singapore. Our
results indicate that the opt-out system with priority rule generates the largest donation
rates, with the largest marginal gains arising from the priority rule allocation system. Our
results are consistent with the findings of Kessler and Roth (2012) who found that a
priority rule allocation program will increase donation rates, but we complement their
finding to encompass the opt-out rule which is currently being utilized in other countries.
Although there are a large number of living donors within the U.S., there is
currently 0.8 living donors for each deceased donor, we focus on deceased donation as
the number of potential deceased donors is far above the number of current deceased
donors and many types of organ transplantation rely exclusively on deceased donation.5
Approaches to increase the organ supply from deceased donation broadly fall into two
classes: improving the donation rates of eligible deceased donors and enlarging the pool
of potential donors. The donation rates can be improved by increasing the consent rates
from the potential donors’ next-of-kin. Since first drafted in 1968, the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) established that an individual’s statement of intent to be an
organ donor is legally binding (Bonnie et al. 2008). However, it is still common practice
to ask the permission of the deceased’s next-of-kin to donate their organs. Along this
vein, the department of Health and Human Service (HHS) passed regulation that requires

5

While a live donor can give a kidney, or a portion of the liver, lung, intestine, or pancreas, it is essentially impossible
for live donation of solid organs such as the heart, pancreas, and intestinal organs.
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all hospitals to report all deaths to the Organ Procurement Organization (OPO).6 This
regulation increases the opportunity that the deceased’s next-of-kin is contacted for organ
donation.
Policymakers have made efforts to increase the donation rate through regulation
and improvements to the organ procurement system. In the U.S. an organ procurement
organization (OPO) is in charge of the procurement of deceased-donor organs. There are
58 such organizations from different regions throughout the U.S. and each regional OPO
obtains direct contact with the deceased’s next-of-kin. In April 2003, HHS launched the
Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative to improve the donation rate.7 The goal of
the collaborative is to encourage the adoption of “best practices” for increasing access to
transplantable organs. Recent research suggests that the collaborative has increased
organ donation within the U.S. (Howard et al. 2007; Shafer et al. 2008).
Another approach to increase the organ supply is to enlarge the pool of potential
donors or generating a higher registration rate among the population. Our experiment is
targeted at this mechanism for increasing the organ supply as we measure the relative
effectiveness of potential policy changes that target increasing the number of potential
donors. Our paper is novel in that we conduct a controlled lab experiment to compare
policy regimes under different institutions of organ donor registration that currently exist
in the world today. Results from the experiment will inform the discussion of possible
changes in organ donation public policy. We consider two highly publicized proposals:

6

This policy was announced in June 1998: http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/980617.html
The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative began in 2003 at the request of HHS Secretary Tommy G.
Thompson.
7
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changing the default rule for organ donor registration and changing the organ allocation
rule.
Changing the default rule affects decision-making. Economists have highlighted
the substantial role that defaults play in numerous areas, including health care plans
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), automobile insurance (Johnson et al. 1993),
retirement saving plans (Madrian and Shea 2001) and consent to online privacy policies
(Johnson et al. 2002). Results show that people often choose the default option to which
they are assigned, suggesting that changing the default choice of the organ donation
question may influence donation decisions. The U.S. operates an opt-in policy regime so
that the individual must self-select and register to be an organ donor. In other words, the
current default choice in the U.S. is non-donor. One proposed policy alternative is to
change the default option to being a donor, what is referred to as an opt-out system.
Under an opt-out regime, an individual must self-select out of being an organ donor.
Altering the default choice influences donation decisions through various
channels (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). First, the default may be considered as the
recommended action by the policy-maker. For example, if the default is that an
individual has consented to be a donor, potential donors might believe being a donor is
recommended by policy-makers. Second, accepting the default may involve less effort
for the individual making decisions. Psychologically, the organ donation decision may
induce stress from thoughts of dying or pain suffered by family members should their
organs be donated. Researching the information about organ donation and filling out
registration forms also involves time and physical effort. These costs are upfront burdens
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placed upon organ donor registration and intensified when the default option is non-donor
(captured by the opt-in rule within our experiment).
Several European countries like Spain and Austria have adopted an opt-out
system for organ donation, while some other European countries like Germany and the
United Kingdom have opt-in default options. With data reported in Gäbel (2002),
Johnson and Goldstein (2003; 2004) compare donor registration rates across European
countries with different default options. They find higher registration rates in countries
where the default choice is being a donor (opt-out). One potential problem of this
method is the assumption that all other observable characteristics can be controlled for
and that the unobservable characteristics are not correlated with donor registration across
countries. We provide support for these empirical results using a laboratory setting
where outside confounders do not exist.
Changing the organ allocation rule is another potential way to increase the pool of
registered donors. The current organ allocation system in U.S. is organized by the United
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). UNOS maintains a national waiting list.
Transplant candidates on the list are ranked, among other things, according to the
candidate’s health condition, physical compatibility between the donor and the candidate
(i.e., the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) matching),8 their distance from the potential
donor, the patient’s preferences for particular donor types (i.e., is the patient willing to
accept an Extended Criteria Donor (ECD) organ) and how long the candidate has been on
the waiting list. When a transplantable organ becomes available, the opportunity goes to
8

A zero HLA mismatch with a particular donor will automatically move a patient up the waiting queue.
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the highest-ranked person on the list. Under the current allocation system utilized by
UNOS an individual is not given priority if they have elected to be a potential donor. A
proposed change is to utilize a priority rule for allocation.9
A priority rule allocation system gives individuals who are on the organ waiting
list and are registered organ donors precedence for transplantable organs. In other words,
the priority rule establishes the top criterion for ranking on the waiting list by whether a
person is registered as an organ donor or not. Individuals who are registered donors rank
higher on the waiting list than those who are not, despite their medical condition or other
differences. The supporters of the priority rule believe that the current organ allocation
system in the U.S. does not provide enough incentive for organ donation because it relies
purely on altruistic motives. The priority rule motivates an individual to donate by
connecting the potential of helping others to the potential of helping one’s self. The
results from our experiment validate this motivation.
Israel and Singapore are examples of countries that have adopted a priority rule
for their national donation system. Israel has been using the priority rule system since
2010 (Lavee et al. 2010).10 However, Israeli citizens need to elect to be included as a
registered donor to receive priority over those not willing to be donors. Singapore passed
the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) in 1987, which applies the priority rule with

9

The final decision to utilize an organ is made by the transplant surgeon. However, changes in the allocation
mechanism will alter the distribution of organ offers.
10
The new organ allocation policy was first suggested to the Israel National Transplant Council (INTC) in 2006. It was
put into effect in January 2010. The new policy can be found as the Organ Transplant Law 5768-2008, Israeli Book of
Laws (English translation provided by the Israeli Ministry of Justice).
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an opt-out system.11 In Singapore, citizens are assumed to be organ donors, but any
person who objects to HOTA can elect not to be included. If a person objects to donate
his organs upon death, he automatically gives up priority for receiving an organ should
they need one in the future. Therefore, the policy currently implemented in Singapore
combines all the features that may increase organ donation over the current U.S.
paradigm.
Our experimental design complements the recent work of Kessler and Roth
(2012). Kessler and Roth designed a laboratory experiment to test for changes in the
decision to register as a donor using alterations in the allocation rule (i.e., priority rule)
and financial incentives (i.e., a rebate and discount). As mentioned earlier, Kessler and
Roth illustrate that organ donation rates will increase if one elects to utilize a priority rule
for organ allocation. Our research extends this research in two important dimensions.
One, we investigate whether or not the results expressed in Kessler and Roth (2012) are a
construct of the neutral framing used in their experiment as the terms “organ” and “organ
donation” are not used. Secondly, we investigate whether or not the utilization of an optout versus an opt-in decision rule combined with a priority rule can yield further
increases in organ donation. The latter is extremely important as it investigates the
marginal effects of other countries policies on the organ donation decision.
Our research can be used to further inform the policy debate surrounding the
current organ donation system. We not only compare the alternative policies (opt-out and
11

Details of the HOTA can be found
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Adb05e985-f8a0-4d61-a9069fd39f3b5ac9%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A02%2F01%2F2011%20TransactionTime%3A31%2F07%2F2005%
20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0#legis
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priority allocation rules) to the current U.S. donation system, but we also test the relative
effectiveness of different alternative policies in an effort to decompose their marginal
effects. In addition, we further evaluate the combination of the opt-out and priority
allocation rule. The opt-out with priority system, as discussed by Breyer and Kliemt
(2007) and utilized by Singapore, provides a dual-incentive for donation: avoiding the
cost of opting-out and receiving priority on the waiting list. A concern with combining
the opt-out and priority allocation system is that the priority rule cannot prevent the freerider problem if the introduction of the opt-out system has already generated sufficient
organ supply (Breyer and Kliemt 2007). Investigating this using observational data
would be infeasible but within our experiment we can investigate whether or not this
concern is valid. Our result suggests that the combination of opt-out and priority rule is
significantly more effective in increasing registration rates than each of the other
separable policies.
An additional advancement we make is that the instructions to subjects in our
experiment are stated in terms of “organs.” The framing choice that should be applied in
the experimental study of policy evaluation is controversial (Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt
2006; Cason and Raymond 2011). The reason we choose descriptive framing here is that
we believe the organ donation decision involves significant psychological costs that
cannot be captured using abstract terms. To measure the impact of framing on
experimentally-observed donation decisions, we included an additional treatment, in
which the instructions are stated in abstract terms. By doing this, we are able to discuss

22

the impact on the decision to donate “tokens” or donate “organs.” Our results indicate
that descriptive framing increases the rate of donor registration.
In the following section, we present our behavioral hypotheses. In Section Two,
we outline the experimental design utilized to investigate our hypotheses on the impact
that the opt-out versus opt-in and priority allocation rules have on the organ donation
decision. In Section Three we discuss the results from the experiment and in the final
section we summarize our findings.

Behavioral Hypotheses
We designed an incentivized laboratory experiment to evaluate the relative
effectiveness of different organ donation mechanisms. We adopted a two-by-two design
illustrated in Table 3 with the dimensions being the opt-in versus opt-out decision rule
combined with the presence or absence of the priority allocation rule.
Table 3. Two-by-Two Experimental Design
Default Options
Opt-in
Opt-out
Allocation Rules
Without Priority Rule Control Treatment
With Priority Rule

Opt-out Treatment

Priority Treatment Opt-out with Priority Treatment

The Control treatment models the current status quo of the U.S. donation system,
where subjects are non-donors by default and no one is granted priority for being a
registered donor. The Opt-out treatment is different from the Control treatment only in
the default choice of the donation decision. As we discussed, there are costs associated
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with making an active organ donation decision. In our experiment, we model these costs
as a simple monetary cost, which is charged if a subject deviates from the default. Being
an organ donor in the Opt-out treatment is less costly than in the Control treatment. This
leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice of the donation
decision from opt-in to opt-out increases the donor registration rate.
The only difference between the Control treatment and the Priority treatment is
the organ allocation rule. In the Priority treatment, subjects who are registered donors
receive priority when they need an organ, while non-donors are only able to access
available organs when the needs of the registered donors on the waiting list are satisfied.
Under the priority rule, donors can jump in front of non-donors on the waiting list. That
is, the priority rule increases the probability that donors who need an organ will receive
one if they are registered donors. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, changing the organ allocation rule by adding
donors’ priority increases the donor registration rate.
In addition to comparing each alternative mechanism with the current status quo,
we are also interested in the relative effectiveness of changing the default choice and
changing the organ allocation rule. More formally, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, changing the current status quo to the opt-out
system yields the same level of increase in the donation rate as changing to the priority
rule system.
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The Opt-out with Priority treatment combines the effect of changing both the
default choice (reducing the cost of donor registration) and changing the organ allocation
rule (increasing the benefit of donation). It would be expected that the dual-incentives
working congruently will be more effective than in the singular case. There is some
concern, however, that if the change to an opt-out default choice increases donation
registration significantly such that individuals are gaining very little from the priority
allocation rule, then the combination of the policies may not result in higher donation
rates (Breyer and Kliemt 2007). In this case, the dual-incentives will not be more
effective. We test the following hypothesis on the combination of the opt-out and
priority allocation rule:
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice and the organ
allocation rule together generates the same level of increase in the donor registration rate
as changing only one of them.
The framing of the decision task may impact the decision to be donor or not
within the experiment. An additional advantage of our experiments is the ability to
formally investigate the framing effect. We conducted an additional treatment, a neutral
framing of the Control treatment (opt-in combined without priority), to investigate the
impact that our contextual framing of the decision process had on subject behavior. This
generates our final research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, subjects behave the same when the experiment is
framed in abstract terms as when the experiment is framed in term of organs.
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Experimental Design
There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment and a finite number of
periods in each round. Subjects were unaware of the number of rounds, but they were
informed at the beginning of the experiment that only one round would be randomly
selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Each subject was a virtual human in
the lab who had one A organ and two B organs.12 In each period, subjects had a 10%
probability of an A organ failure and a 20% probability of a B organ failure (both B
organs fail together).13 If a subject encountered an A organ failure, she ceased to
participate in that round. Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, she was placed on a
waiting list to receive one B organ donated by another subject.14 Subjects waiting for a B
organ were not subjected to the probability of an A organ failure. Each subject with a B
organ failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the waiting list. If they did not receive a B
organ within this time period, they ceased to participate in that round.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were asked to make a decision about
whether they wanted to register as an organ donor (the opt-in rule) or withdraw from the
donor registry (the opt-out rule). Since we only focus on the donor registration decision
not the procurement process, we utilized a strong version of donation in our experiment
in which registering as a donor implies being a donor upon death in the experiment.

12

Kessler and Roth (2012) have the design of one A units with two B units, where A represents brain and B represents
kidney. We keep the consistent design so that the results of our experiment are comparable.
13
These parameters are identical to those have been used by Kessler and Roth (2012). We also conducted additional
sensitivity analyses, discussed in Appendix A, specific to our design to ensure they are appropriate.
14
The assumption here is that a subject can function normally with one B organ donated by another subject. This is
consistent with kidney transplantation practice.
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Subjects were told that they would earn $3 in each period that they had one active
A organ and at least one active B organ. However, subjects were not able to earn any
money when they were on the waiting list or no longer actively participating in the round.
All donation decisions were made at the beginning of each period before knowing
whether or not they would have an organ failure. All subjects were told that if they chose
to be a donor and their A organ failed first each of their B organs would be donated to
one of the subjects who were on the waiting list in that period. However, if their B
organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated. In addition, if they received
a B organ from others, the donated B organ could not be donated again.
There were costs involved with the donation decision.15 Subjects were told that
they had to pay $0.75 to make an active donation decision (override the default choice).
This cost can be thought as the psychological and physical costs associate with overriding
the default choice, which was charged regardless of the donation outcome. Subjects were
also told that the act of donating organs would cost them $2.25. This donation cost can
be thought as the psychological costs of organ procurement. Thus, one’s payoff for each
round is equal to the earnings in that round minus the costs they incurred for overriding
the default decision as well as donating organs. At the end of the experiment, only one
round was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were told at the beginning of the
experiment that if in the selected round their payoff was negative the extra costs would be
charged from their $10 show-up fee.

15

The true costs associated with organ donation cannot be measured. Here we impose these costs merely to model the
incentives involved in organ donation. Since the costs vary as the default choice changes, we divide the costs into two
parts, the cost of overriding the default and the cost of donation.
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Figure 3. Illustration of the Decision Screen Used in the Experiment
After making the donation decision at the beginning of each round, subjects
observed their outcome for each period, their earnings each period, and their accumulated
earnings for that round. After experiencing a B organ failure, the subject began to
receive the waiting list information. The waiting list information provide subjects with
information on how many periods they had been waiting, their rank on the waiting list
and whether they received a B organ in that period. A screenshot of the information
screen presented to the subjects is shown in Figure 3. Subjects who ceased to participate
in the round were not able to observe any more information until a new round started.
To investigate our five experimental hypotheses we conducted four organ-framed
treatments ― the Control treatment, the Opt-out treatment, the Priority treatment and the
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Opt-out with Priority treatment ― and one neutral-framed treatment.16 In the following,
we provide more detail on the five different treatments used in the experiment.
In the Control treatment, subjects were not organ donors by default. Those who
wished to register as donors were charged $0.75 to change their status. Subjects were
told that being an organ donor might potentially affect others’ earnings. The donation
decision was described in the experiment as follows:
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default. If you
want to change your status to be a donor, please check the box
below; otherwise, please leave it empty.
□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to
participate in this round.”
Subjects were also told that if they chose to be an organ donor, after their A organ
failed, their active B organs would be donated to those in need in the order of their rank
on the waiting list. The rank on the waiting list was determined by the length of time the
subjects had been waiting for a B organ. Subjects who had been waiting longer were
ranked higher.17 The rank of subjects who had the same waiting time was randomly
determined. For example, if there were two subjects on the waiting list and subject 1 had
been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 had been waiting for 3 periods, subject 1 ranked
higher than subject 2.
16

A copy of the experiment instructions for each of the five treatments can be obtained from the corresponding author.
The ordering of subjects on the waiting list implicitly assumes that all the subjects are homogeneous with regard to
their patient-specific characteristics that might impact their status in the queue in the real world. This is a necessary
abstraction so that we can focus on the treatment effects within our experiment.
17
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In the Opt-out treatment, subjects were registered organ donors by default. Those
who wished to withdraw their donor registry were charged $0.75 to opt out. The choice
of this treatment was described as follows:
“In this round, you are an organ donor by default. If you want
to change your status to be a non-donor, please check the box
below; otherwise, please leave it empty.
□ I hereby object to donate my organs after I cease to
participate in this round.”
Unless a subject responded that he or she did not want to be considered a potential
organ donor, their active B organs were donated after an A organ failure occurred.
Organs were provided to those in need according to their rank on the waiting list.
Subjects on the waiting list were ranked by the length of time they had been waiting on
the list, and subjects who had been waiting longer were ranked higher.
The Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the ranking
rule used for the waiting list. In this treatment, the default option for the donation
decision was not to be an organ donor. Before making the donation decision, all subjects
were informed that those who chose to be an organ donor would be given priority ranking
on the waiting list. Therefore, subjects on the waiting list in this treatment were ranked
on the basis of two criteria: first their donation decision, and second the length of time
they had been waiting on the list. For example, if subject 1 is a non-donor who had been
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waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 is a registered donor who had been waiting for 3
periods, subject 2 ranked higher than subject 1.
The Opt-out with Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment in
both the default option and the ranking rule on the waiting list. In this treatment, subjects
were registered organ donors by default. Before making the donation decision, all
subjects were informed that those who withdraw their donor registration would
automatically give up their priority ranking on the waiting list. Transplantable organs
would be provided to registered donors before non-donors.
The description of the decision environment to the subjects in the four treatments
above was stated in terms of organ donations. We conducted an additional treatment ―
the Neutral treatment, in which the instructions to subjects were neutrally-framed, to
control the effect of the experiment framing.
In the Neutral treatment, we adopted the same default option and ranking rule on
the waiting list as the Control treatment. The only difference is that the experiment
description was phrased in abstract terms, not in terms of organs. Subjects were informed
that they would be assigned three tokens in each round: one A token and two B tokens.
In each period, each subject had a 10% probability of losing their A token and a 20%
probability of losing both B tokens. Subjects would earn $3 in each period that they had
one A token and at least one B token. The donation decision in this treatment was
described as follows:

31

“In this round, you are not a donor by default. If you want to
change your status to be a donor, please check the box below;
otherwise, please leave it empty.
□ I hereby agree to donate my B tokens after I cease to
participate in this round.”
We conducted eighteen experimental sessions with 15 subjects in each session. In
twelve sessions, subjects played 15 rounds in one of the organ-framed treatments
followed by 15 rounds in another one of the organ-framed treatments (for example,
subjects participated in the Control treatment for rounds 1-15 and then the Opt-out
treatment for rounds 16-30). In these sessions, subjects were stopped after round 15 and
told that they would start a new treatment.18 Subjects were handed the instructions for
the new treatment and the experimenter clearly explained all changes in the rules.
In three of the remaining sessions, subjects played the Control treatment in all 30
rounds, while in the last three treatments subjects played the Neutral treatment in all 30
rounds. In these sessions, subjects were also stopped after round 15. They were told that
they would start a new treatment, but there were no changes in the rules of the game. The
experimenter again reviewed all the rules of the game. All of the treatment combinations
used in the experiment are shown in Table 4. Lastly, the selection of which session to
conduct among the eighteen sessions was randomly determined prior to subjects entering
the experiment laboratory.

18

Subjects experienced a break after round 15, so that we had the same group of subjects that played in two
different treatments.
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Table 4. Number of Sessions for Each Treatment Combination
Treatment Rounds 16-30
Treatment
Opt-out with
Control
Opt-out
Priority
Rounds 1-15
Priority

Neutral

Control

3 Sessions

1 Session

1 Session

1 Session

No
Sessions

Opt-out

1 Session

No
Sessions

1 Session

1 Session

No
Sessions

Priority

1 Session

1 Session

No
Sessions

1 Session

No
Sessions

Opt-out with
Priority

1 Session

1 Session

1 Session

No Sessions

No
Sessions

Neutral

No
Sessions

No
Sessions

No
Sessions

No Sessions

3 Sessions

At the end of each session, the subjects were presented with a brief questionnaire
on their demographic characteristics and their involvement with organ donation in their
own lives. They received payment after they completed the questionnaire.

Results
The experiment was performed at the Georgia State University Experimental
Economics Center (ExCEN). Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student
body using a recruiting program that randomly invites registered subjects to participate in
the experiment. A total of 270 subjects participated in the experiment and the average
payment was $18.03.19 Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the experiment.
There are 8100 observations at the subject-round level. The average donor registration
rate for all treatments is 41.5%. The average donation rates by treatment were as follows:

19

The experiment was conducted using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fishbacher 2007).
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Opt-out with Priority (70.8%), Priority (61.3%), Opt-out (48.8%), Control (25.3%), and
Neutral (17.8%). The descriptive statistics clearly indicate that the highest average
donation rates arise when the priority rule is utilized. This finding is consistent with that
of Kessler and Roth (2012), but the descriptive statistics also illustrate that substantial
gains can be achieved using just an opt-out policy.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment
Variable
Obs
Mean
Round Profit
8100
9.216
Round Cost
8100
0.582
Payment
8100
18.033
Flier
8100
0.211
Donation Registration Rate
8100
0.415

Std. Dev.
9.83
0.90
9.28
0.41
0.49

Min
-3
0
7
0
0

Max
87
3
63.25
1
1

Control Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

2700

0.253

0.43

0

1

Opt-out Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.488

0.50

0

1

Priority Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.613

0.49

0

1

Opt-out with Priority Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.708

0.45

0

1

Neutral Treatment
Donation Registration Rate

1350

0.178

0.38

0

1

Figure 4 shows the percentage of subjects who were registered organ donors
(those who either opted in or did not opt out) in each round of the experiment for each
treatment. The line breaks indicate that subjects were stopped after round 15 in each
session and then restarted under a new treatment from round 16 through 30. Figure 4
suggests that changing the default option and/or altering the organ allocation rule has a
significant positive impact on the donor registration rate across all 30 rounds. The
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Control treatment lies beneath the three other organ-framed treatments regardless of
being played in the first or last 15 rounds. Figure 4 also suggests that the experiment
framing plays an important role. The organ-framed treatment generates a higher average
donor registration rate than the neutral-framed treatment. This difference in registration
rate across treatments is even more notable in the last 15 rounds.

Figure 4. Percent of Donors in Each Treatment Reported by Round of the Experiment
To more rigorously investigate the treatment differences a series of Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests were conducted comparing the donation decisions of subjects across
treatments. Table 6 illustrates the results from these tests. The test statics are conducted
using three different data partitions. The first pools all of the data across rounds, the
second focuses on the first 15 rounds in the experiment and the third partition analyzes
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the last 15 rounds. The results from all of the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests clearly indicate
that the donation decisions across treatments are statistically different from one another.
They are also consistent with the observation that the donation rate is highest in the Optout with Priority treatment and the lowest is the Neutral treatment.

Table 6. Wilcoxon Rank-sum Tests
Treatment

Treatment

Test Statistic
Pooled Data Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30

Control

vs

Opt-out

-14.988***

-11.493***

-9.713***

Control

vs

Priority

-22.309***

-13.895***

-17.680***

Control

vs Opt-out with Priority

-27.818***

-19.491***

-19.897***

Control

vs

Neutral

5.376***

2.362**

5.431***

Opt-out

vs

Priority

-6.498***

-2.141**

-7.036***

Opt-out

vs Opt-out with Priority

-11.656***

-7.402***

-9.102***

Priority

vs Opt-out with Priority

-5.241***

-5.298***

-2.121**

Note: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7. Probit Regressions on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment
Probit Estimation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.249*** 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.248*** 0.252***
Opt-out
(0.016)
(0.023)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.024)
0.365*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.311*** 0.315***
Priority
(0.015)
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.023)
0.451*** 0.450*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.431***
Opt-out with Priority
(0.014)
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
-0.098***
-0.058**
-0.055**
-0.055**
-0.052**
Neutral
(0.017)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.025)
Second Treatment
-0.058*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.065***
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.021)
Second×Opt-out
-0.038
-0.030
-0.029
-0.023
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.034)
Second×Priority
0.094*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.100***
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.036)
Second×Opt-out with Priority
0.005
0.014
0.010
0.014
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.036)
Second×Neutral
-0.091** -0.093** -0.088** -0.085**
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.036)
(0.036)
Earnings Last Round
0.003*** 0.001*
0.001*
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Received an Organ Last Round
0.047** 0.047**
(0.021)
(0.021)
Organ Benefit Last Round
0.003*
0.003*
(0.001)
(0.001)
Male
0.011
(0.012)
White
0.076***
(0.019)
Donor in Real Life
0.050***
(0.012)
N
Chi2
Pseudo R2

8100
1375.02
0.1250

8100
1425.66
0.1297

7830
1388.24
0.1306

7830
1416.61
0.1333

7801
1466.78
0.1385

Note: All variables are expressed as marginal values. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** significant at the 1%
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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We additionally conducted a series of probit regressions to investigate the
marginal effect of different mechanisms on organ donation decisions. The results are
illustrated in Table 7. The independent variables in the probit regressions include the
four treatment dummy variables Opt-out, Priority, Opt-out with Priority, and Neutral
corresponding with the different cells of the experimental design (Model 1). The
reference group is the donation decision in the Control treatment, which is the opt-in
system currently used in the U.S. We further control whether a decision is made in the
first 15 rounds or in last 15 rounds of the experiment using a dummy variable interaction
term (Model 2). The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1 if a treatment is
played in the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the four primary treatment dummies
in Model 1. Regression Models 3 and 4 control for the effect of information in the
previous round on the current donor registration decision. Earnings Last Round
represents earnings from the previous round (Model 3). Received an Organ Last Round
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the subject received an organ donated by others in
the previous round. Organ Benefit Last Round captures the earnings from the previous
round after receiving an organ (Model 4). Lastly, regression Model 5 includes
demographic control variables Male, White, and Donor in Real Life. The latter is a
dummy variable indicating that the subject is currently a registered organ donor.
Focusing on our first research hypothesis the results for the experiment validate
our hypothesis that the opt-out rule generates a higher donor registration rate than the optin rule. Figure 4 illustrates that the opt-out rule has a significant positive impact on the
donor registration rate in all rounds. Across all rounds, the Opt-out treatment has an
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average donation rate of 48.8%, which is almost twice the average donation rate of 25.3%
in the Control treatment. Over the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out treatment had an average
donation rate of 53.8%, while the Control treatment had a much lower average rate of
27.7%. Over rounds 16-30, the Opt-out treatment had a rate of 43.9%, while the Control
treatment only had a rate of 22.9%. Results from the non-parametric tests in Table 6 are
consistent with the observation that the Control treatment had a statistically significant
lower donor registration rate than the Opt-out treatment regardless of being played in the
first or last 15 rounds. The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are -14.988, -11.493 and -9.713 for
pooled data, first 15 rounds and last 15 rounds of the experiment respectively when
comparing the Control treatment with the Opt-out treatment.
The probit regressions in Table 7 also support our first research hypothesis. The
positive and highly statistically significant coefficient on the Opt-out dummy variable in
regression Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 25% more likely to register as a
donor in the Opt-out treatment than in the Control treatment across all 30 rounds.
Furthermore, this finding is robust to the additional controls used in the other
econometric specifications (Models 2 through 5). This represents an almost 100%
increase in the donor registration rate over the 25.3% donor registration rate observed in
the Control treatment. This finding suggests that a significant increase in the donation
rate can be achieved by just introducing the opt-out rule.
In order to test our second research hypothesis we must compare the Control
treatment (the baseline opt-in without priority system) with the Priority treatment as well
as the Opt-out treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment. A statistically
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significant and higher donor registration rate for the Priority and Opt-out with Priority
treatments, relative to the Control and Opt-out treatments respectively, will support our
second research hypothesis. Figure 4 illustrate that the Priority treatment has a higher
average donor registration rate than the Control treatment in all rounds. The average
donation rate for the Priority treatment is 61.3% over all rounds, 59.6% over the first 15
rounds, and 63.0% over the last 15 rounds. A higher donation rate is also observed in the
Opt-out with Priority treatment when compared to the Opt-out treatment. The average
donation rate for this treatment was 70.8% over all rounds, 73.2% for the first 15 rounds
and 68.4% for last 15 rounds.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests also demonstrate that the Control treatment
generates statistically significantly lower donor registration rates than the Priority
treatment over all rounds as well as in rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 separately. The test
statistics are -22.309, -13.895, and -17.680 when comparing the Control treatment with
the Priority treatment for all the rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively. The
results comparing the Opt-out treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment are
similar to those observed when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority
treatment; adding the priority allocation rule increases the rate of organ donation. The
Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics are -11.656, -7.402 and -9.102 when comparing the
total rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively. This said, the marginal
differences between the Opt-out treatment and the Opt-out with Priority treatment are not
as large as the marginal differences between the Control treatment and the Priority
treatment. The donor registration rate increased by 45% going from the Opt-out
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treatment to the Opt-out with Priority treatment whereas it increased by 142% going from
the Control treatment to the Priority treatment.
The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as the statistically
significant and positive coefficient on Priority indicates that the donation rate increases
by between 31.5% and 36.5%, depending on the model assumptions. The statistically
significant and positive coefficient on Opt-out with Priority indicates that the donation
rate increases by between 42.8% and 45.1%, depending on the model assumptions. Both
of these coefficients are interpreted relative to the Control treatment so the relative gains
observed under the Opt-out with Priority treatment must be purged of the Opt-out effect
solely to be comparable to the Control versus Priority treatment. Both of these results
are consistent with those observed in Kessler and Roth (2012) as it is clearly evident that
changing the allocation rule to a priority rule will increase the donor registration rate.
This said, these comparisons do raise the question of whether or not just using the Optout rule is capable of providing a similar gain as that observed when altering the
allocation rule. This is more formally investigated under our third research hypothesis.
Our previous research hypotheses have illustrated that altering either the organ
allocation rule, using a priority rule system, or the default choice, going from an Opt-in to
an Opt-out program, will increase the organ donor registration rate. The results from our
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests as well as the probit regressions clearly indicate that the organ
donation rate is greater when comparing either the Opt-out treatment or the Priority
treatment with the Control (opt-in) treatment. From a public policy perspective it may be
of interest whether or not the relative gains are comparable, as both policies require
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different forms of administrative change that may or may not be more palatable for
different administrations and the populous. On average going from the Control treatment
to the Opt-out treatment increased the organ donation rate from 25.3% to 48.8% whereas
going to the Priority treatment increased it to 61.3%. This provides the first evidence
that does not support our third research hypothesis that they generate equivalent marginal
gains in the organ donor rate. Our regression results further confirm this observation.
Comparing the coefficient on the Opt-out treatment with the Priority treatment illustrates
that in all the models estimated the Priority treatment coefficient is statistically
significant and greater than the Opt-out treatment coefficient (p<0.01). Therefore, our
third research is not supported. However, it is important to note that changing the default
choice, going from an Opt-in to an Opt-out system, is able to generate approximately
80% of the gains achievable when altering the allocation rule. Therefore, although it is
not a one-to-one equivalent the gains are significant enough that policy makers may wish
to consider changing just the default option versus the allocation rule if changing the
default option is a more palatable public policy.
Investigating our third research hypothesis illustrated that sizable gains are
achievable by changing either the allocation rule or the default choice, with the allocation
rule outperforming the default choice by a small margin. Our fourth research hypothesis
investigates whether or not using either of these changes in isolation yields the same
result as combining them and utilizing an Opt-out with Priority program. Figure 4
clearly illustrates that Opt-out with Priority treatment outperforms both the Opt-out
treatment and the Priority treatment separately, as it generated the highest donation rate
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of all the treatments. This does not support our fourth research hypothesis, as it is clear
that combining both changes exceeds either of them individual. Over all the rounds the
average donation rate was 70.8% for the Opt-out with Priority treatment, compared with
48.8% and 61.3% observed under the Opt-out and Priority treatments respectively. This
is also true when comparing the results from rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30. Over the
first 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of
73.2%, while the Opt-out treatment was 53.8% and the Priority treatment was 59.6%.
Over the last 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate
of 68.4% while the Opt-out treatment was 43.9% and the Priority treatment was 63.0%.
The non-parametric tests indicate that the Opt-out with Priority treatment
outperforms all the other treatments and that the results are statistically significant. The
tests also show that the Opt-out with Priority treatment generates statistically
significantly higher donation registration rates than all the other treatments regardless if
they are played first (rounds 1-15) or last (rounds 16-30). The test statistics comparing
the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment
concretely invalidates our fourth research hypothesis, as it evidences that in all cases the
combined effect of the Opt-out with Priority treatment exceeds the constituent changes
separately. Results from the probit regressions in Table 7 are also consistent with this
observation. The coefficient on Opt-out with Priority in regression (1) is positive and
highly statistically significant, representing that subjects are about 45% more likely to
donate in the Opt-out with Priority treatment than in the Control treatment. Using
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estimates from regression (1), we find that Opt-out with Priority also performs better than
either Opt-out (p<0.01) or Priority (p<0.01) treatments separately.
As mentioned earlier, our experiment is fundamentally different from Kessler and
Roth’s (2012) experiment as it investigates the separable and combined effects of
changing the allocation rule as well as the default option and it contextualizes the
decision environment. Our fifth and final research hypothesis investigates whether or not
the abstract and contextual framing generates the same donor registration rates. Our
experimental results indicate that the contextual framing leads to a larger donor
registration rate than a neutral framing. Evidence of this can be seen in Figure 4, where
the neutral framing donation rates are on average lower than those observed in the
contextual framing treatment. However, the differences are not as clear over rounds 1-15
as they are over rounds 16-30.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and the probit regression results clarify this
treatment effect. The non-parametric tests demonstrate that the Control treatment
generates statistically significantly higher donor registration rates than the Neutral
treatment. This result is still statistically significant for all rounds and if we only focus
on the first 15 rounds or the last 15 round; the test statistics are 5.376, 2.362 and 5.431 for
the respective partitions of the data. The parametric tests estimate the likelihood of
donation in each treatment. The significant negative coefficient on Neutral in regression
Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 10% less likely to register as a donor in the
neutral-framed treatment than in the organ-framed treatment across all 30 rounds. When
controlling for other covariates in the experiment, Models 2 through 5, this percentage
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decreases to around 5%. Therefore, using a neutral framing, as was conducted by Kessler
and Roth (2012), will generate a lower rate of donor registration.
Robustness of Results
Table 7 also report results from probit regressions with controls for order effects,
information from the previous round and demographic controls. Results are qualitatively
the same when we add additional controls. Regression (2) includes a control variable
Second Treatment and its interactions with the treatment variables. The significant
negative coefficient on Second Treatment shows that subjects are 6% less likely to
register when they played the Control treatment in the last 15 rounds. The significant
positive coefficient on the interaction term Second×Priority indicate that the Priority
treatment has an even stronger impact on the registration rate when it was played after
subjects have participated in another organ-framed treatment.
Regression (3) controls for the effect of earnings in the previous round on donor
registration. The significant positive coefficient on Earnings Last Round suggests
earnings in the previous round have a positive impact on the donation decision. Although
subjects played multiple rounds in the experiment, only one round was randomly selected
for payment at the end of each session. Subjects’ donation decisions should not be
affected by their previous earnings. However, subjects could get information about
others’ donation decision through receiving a B organ when needed in a previous period
of the experiment. We further included variables Received an Organ Last round and
Organ Benefit Last Round in regression (4). The significant positive coefficient on
Received an Organ Last Round shows that subjects are 5% more likely to donate if they
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received a B organ in the previous round. Since receiving a B organ leads to additional
earnings, especially earnings after receiving a B organ in the previous round, this may
affect the likelihood of donation. The coefficient on Organ Benefit Last Round is
positive and significant at 10% level. This indicates that the longer one remains active
after receiving a donated organ (resulting in higher earnings that round), the greater the
probability they will be a subsequent donor. Regression (5) controls for demographic
information of the subjects. Among our selected subjects, whites are 8% more likely to
register as a donor than all non-white races. Subjects who were self-reported as organ
donor in real life are 5% more like to register as a donor. These two results are
statistically significant.

Conclusion
A fundamental limitation to the success of transplantation-based medical
treatments is the supply of organs. Although there have been sizeable gains in the
development of immunosuppressant drugs that have increased the pool of potential
candidates for a donated organ, there still exists an ever widening gap between the
number of organ donors and the number of patients on the waiting list. Recently, the
transplantation community has made sizable gains in the utilization of donated organs
(Howard et al. 2007; Shafer et al. 2008), but future changes in public policy may be
required to increase the rate of organ donation within the United States in order to save
more lives. Drawing from the experiences in other countries, changes in public policy
can arise from either changing the allocation rule to provide priority for those who are

46

registered donors or from changing the default choice from a standard opt-in to an opt-out
system. Furthermore, as is the case in Singapore, it is possible to combine both changes
in the allocation rule and default choice. The results from our experiment provide the
first rigorous investigation of changing both the allocation rules and default choice
separately as well as jointly.
Our results are consistent with those previously observed in Kessler and Roth
(2012), in that changing the allocation rule to a priority rule system yields a sizable
increase in the organ donation rate. We further extend this finding to illustrate that the
priority rule generates a larger marginal gain than altering the default choice from an optin to an opt-out public policy. In addition, we find that combining both an opt-out and
priority rule policy will provide the largest gains in the organ donation rate and that gains
are substantially different from the individual effect of each public policy change. We
further find evidence that the context of the experiment used to investigate the organ
donation decision does matter with a contextualized decision environment yielding an
increase in organ donation rates of around 5%.
An important public policy finding that our results illustrate is that approximately
80% of the gains observed under a priority allocation rule are achievable by switching
from an opt-in to an opt-out public policy. This is extremely important from a public
policy perspective as the costs, both pecuniary and psychological, associated these two
possible changes may be substantially different. A change in the allocation rule redefines
the rules of whom is to receive priority for an organ which post-transplantation may
invoke concepts of fairness and equality as enforcement of this rule may still rely on the
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deceased donors next-of-kin being amenable to their deceased’s donation preferences.
On the other hand, an opt-out policy redefines the rule of who owns a deceased’s
individuals organs from the next-of-kin to the government. The choice of which option is
more appropriate is subject to the policy maker’s discretion and the constituents that they
represent.
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Chapter III: Improving the Approach to Organ Donor Registration

Introduction
Numerous lives with organ failure could be saved by organ transplants. In the
United States, deceased donors supply the majority of transplanted organs. Based on data
from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), about 78% of U.S.
organ transplants performed in 2012 were from decreased donors. 20 Despite the large
need for deceased donor organs (over 120,000 people are currently waiting for a lifesaving transplantable organ), only 42.7% of residents over the age of 18 in the United
States are registered organ donors (Donate Life America 2012).21 Since 1995, over
111,000 people on a waiting list to receive an organ have died.22 Clearly, the current
donor registration system fails to produce enough potential deceased donors to satisfy the
large organ demand.
This paper proposes to improve donor registry by adding a persuasive message
with the registration request. A persuasive message is a request for action when it is
supposed that the recipient maybe reluctant or unaware. In this paper, I consider a
persuasive message enhancing the benefits of organ donation, such as how many lives
can be saved by one deceased organ donor.23 In the United States, an individual who

20

Based on OPTN data as of May 17, 2013, around 21,000 organ transplants performed in 2012 were from decreased
donors.
21
Waiting list numbers are based on Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data as of April 27,
2012. Registration rate is reported by statistics of Donate Life America.
22
Based on OPTN Death Removals Data as of May 10, 2013.
23
One deceased donor who can donate multiple organs (heart, lung, kidneys, pancreas and intestine) and tissues
(cornea, bone, skin, heart valves, tendons, veins, etc.) has the potential to save as many as 50 lives through organ and
tissue donation.
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wishes to be a deceased donor can register through the department of motor vehicles in
his state of residence. The request for donor registration is commonly simple; an
individual can either check a “Yes” box following a generic question such as “Do you
wish to register to be an organ and tissue donor?”, or leave it empty. I experimentally
investigate whether supplementing this generic question with a persuasive message
increases donor registration rate.
The message proposal is inspired by the evidence of the effectiveness of
persuasive messages on charity fundraising and healthy behavior promotion. Just as the
organ donation, many charity organizations are experiencing a shortage in donations as
the result of an economic downturn. This leads to the literature in fundraising that studies
the effectiveness of persuasive messages on promoting donations. One key factor of the
persuasive message in order to motivate donation is that it carries evidence that increases
the perceived value of the Charity goal, and therefore motivates donation (Das et al.,
2008). Burt and Strongman (2004) used the method of psychological questionnaire to
examine the effect of including image evidence within the donation request on donations.
The authors find that using image of children is particularly powerful to motivate
donations, and image of children showing negative emotions generates even stronger
emotional reactions among potential donors. Another closely related work by Chou and
Murnigham (2013) investigates how the persuasive message influences decisions on
blood donation. The authors conducted a field experiment through the collaboration of
the Red Cross, where messages about blood donation across different frames (“save a
life” versus “prevent a death”) and urgency level (“urgent needs” versus “moderate
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needs”) was emailed to 19 undergraduate residential groups at the Northwestern
University. They find that among their selected subjects, those who received “prevent a
death” emails were more likely to donate, while emails indicating “urgent needs” did not
generate more donors. Jeong et al. (2011) further suggest that gain/loss-framed messages
have different effect on audience with different dispositional motivation (approachoriented versus avoidance-oriented) and charity appeals should be tailored according to
the motivational dynamics of the target audience. An organ donation related work by
Anker and Feeley (2011) focuses on the usage of messages in obtaining donation consent.
The authors studied 15 specific messages across 4 domain areas and find the content of
request message is associated with familial consent.
Within the health domain, persuasive messages have been found to be effective to
improve health practice. Morman (2000) investigates whether a persuasive message can
motivate men to begin regular performance of the testicular self-exam (TSE) in order to
detect testicular cancer. The author finds that a fear message can educate individuals
about the threat of diseases and motivate them to perform TSE on a regular basis.
Rothman and Salovey (1997) proposed that how a message is framed alter a message’s
persuasive impact on different health behaviors. A loss-framed message is more
persuasive when developing initiatives to promote detective behaviors, while a gainframed message is more effective when targeting prevention behaviors. Rothman et al.
(1999) further conducted two psychological experiments which provide empirical support
to the theoretical framework by Rothman and Salovey (1997). The two experiments
investigate the framework in the context of both hypothetical and real health problems.
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Their results directly confirm the relation between message framing and health behaviors
predicted by Rothman and Salovey (1997).
There are a number of reasons why such a persuasive message may increase the
number of registered organ donors. First, it may educate potential donors of the value of
organ donation and make them more knowledgeable. Knowledge about organ donation
has been shown to be significantly associated with the behavioral intent to register as a
donor (Morgan and Miller, 2002). This relation is also evidenced in the context of
educational policy interventions that aims to increase intention to be organ donors (Quinn
et al., 2006; Thornton et al., 2012).
Second, a persuasive message could create an emotional connection between the
audience and the recipient in need of their help. For instance, it evokes empathy that
makes the audience perceive more of themselves in others who are in need of help, and
therefore can increase helping behavior (Cialdini et al., 1997).
Third, this message addresses the likelihood that the goal of charity can be
attained ― one donor may potentially save as many as 50 lives. Individuals are not
likely to donate unless they believe donating could help solve the problem and reach the
charity goal (Das, Kerkhof, and Kuiper, 2008). Donations are more likely when there is
evidence that the charity goal can be achieved, such as the charity organization is
perceived to be effective (Sargeant, West, and Ford, 2004), or the information that others
contribute as well (Sell and Wilson, 1991; Croson and Marks, 1998; Clark, 2002). This
leads us to the hypothesis:
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Hypothesis: Changing the content of the donor registration request ― by
including a persuasive message about the benefits of organ donation ― increases the
registration rate.
I examined the hypothesis by using a laboratory experimental method. The basic
design bears similarity to Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013), where subjects played virtual
lives and the only decision is to choose whether or not to be an organ donor. I kept
consistent experimental parameters and implementation with Li, Hawley, and Schnier
(2013), since I combined part of their data into my data analysis. Subjects started each
round of the experiment with a donor registration decision. In a control treatment,
subjects faced a standard registration request inspired by the current donor registration
request applied in the United States. This is compared to an information treatment where
the request includes a persuasive message highlights the value of donation. The
persuasive message is shown to have a positive impact on donation decisions in the early
rounds of the experiment. Subjects are about 13 percent more likely to register as a
donor in round 1 of the information treatment than the control treatment. The results also
indicate that the information treatment affects donation decisions in the experiment
mainly among subjects who are not organ donors in real life, while the treatment effect is
very small for those who are self-reported organ donors. Subjects who are non-donors in
real life are about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in the experiment when
they are provided with persuasive messages.
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This paper proceeds as follows. The following section outlines the experimental
design utilized in this study. Section Three represents the results from the experiment.
The final section concludes the paper.

Experimental Design
In the experimental design, each subject lives a virtual life where the only
decision is to be an organ donor or not. The description of the experiment in the
instructions to subjects was stated in terms of organ donations. Each round of the
experiment, the subject was endowed with one A organ (not transplantable) and two B
organs (transplantable). In each period, each subject had 10% probability of A organ
failure and 20% probability of B organs failure (both B organs fail together). No subject
was involved into both organ failures at the same time. Whenever an A organ failure
happened to a subject, he was considered dead in that round and the round ended for him.
When a subject’s A organ failed, his B organs were still alive and transplantable in that
period. Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, he was placed on a waiting list to receive
one B organ donated by others (for example, people have two kidneys, but can still live
with one healthy kidney). Subjects with B failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the list.
If they did not receive a B organ within the given periods, they were considered dead in
that round and the round ended for them.
Subjects started each round with the default of being a non-donor. At the
beginning of each round subjects were asked to make a decision about whether they
wanted to register as an organ donor, so that subjects made their decisions before
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knowing whether they would be involved in an organ failure. All subjects were told that
if they chose to be a donor and their A organ failed first, each of their B organs would be
donated to the subjects who were on the waiting list in that period. However, if their B
organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated. In addition, if they received
a B organ from others, this received B organ could not be donated again.
There were two types of costs involved in the donation decision making.24
Subjects were told that they had to pay $0.75 to register as a donor. This cost can be
thought as the transaction cost of donor registry. Subjects were also told that a virtual
donation would cost them $2.25. This donation cost can be thought as the psychological
costs for the donors and their families to actually donate organs.

Figure 5. Screenshot of the Experimental Program

24

This is a consistent design with Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013). Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) designed two types
of costs to measure the effect of different default choices on donation decision. Since I am using part of the data from
Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) in my analysis, I kept the same design so data from the two works is comparable.
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After making the donation decision, subjects observed their health status.
Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that they were able to earn $3 in
each period that they had both one A organ and at least one B organ. Figure 5 shows a
screenshot of the information screen that was presented to the subjects. Subjects received
information about their health status in each period, their earnings in each period, and
their accumulated earnings in that round. Once a subject’s B organs failed, they started
to observe the waiting list information: how many periods they have been waiting, their
rank on the waiting list and whether they receives a B organ in that period. If subjects are
considered dead, they are not able to observe any more information until the new round
starts.
All subjects were informed at the beginning of the experiment that only one round
would be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the experiment. Subjects were told at
the beginning of experiment that they had earned $10 for showing up at the experiment.
If their earnings were less than the donation cost in the selected payment round, the extra
cost would be deducted from their show-up earnings.
The experimental treatments varied the content of the registration request
provided to subjects. In the control treatment, subjects faced a request states:
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default. If you
want to change your status to be a donor, please check the box
below; otherwise, please leave it empty.
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□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to
participate in this round.”
Besides the message above, subjects in the information treatment received a
message about benefits of organ donation in the experiment ― the additional earnings a
subject earned on average after he was saved by a B organ donated by others. This
information was collected from data attained in Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013). The
message was stated as follows:
“According to the data collected from previous sessions of the
same experiment series, a subject who was saved by a donated
organ earned $10.18 more on average in each round,
compared with the average earnings of $18.63 per subject per
round.”
I conducted three experimental sessions of each treatment, with 15 subjects in
each session. There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment. In each session,
subjects experienced a break between round 15 and 16.25 Subjects were stopped after
round 15 and told that they would start a new treatment, but there was no change in the
rules. The experimenter again handed out the instructions and reviewed all rules.

25

This is another consistent design with Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013). Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) adopted a
within-subject design where subjects in each session play the first 15 rounds in one treatment and followed by 15
rounds in another treatment. I combined data from three sessions in Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) with my data
analysis. In these three sessions, Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) had subjects play a control treatment through all 30
rounds, though they still experienced a break between round 15 and 16. I kept the same design so data from the two
works are comparable.
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After finishing all 30 rounds, subjects were informed of which round was
randomly selected for payment. At the same time, subjects were asked whether they
would like to receive a flier containing some information about organ donation. While
the experimenters were preparing for payment, subjects were presented with a
questionnaire on their demographic characteristics. After they completed the
questionnaire, subjects received their payments in cash one by one and those who
requested fliers were also provided with an organ donation flier.

Results
The experiment was performed in the laboratory of the Georgia State University
Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN).26 Subjects were recruited from the
undergraduate student body using a recruiting program that randomly invites registered
subjects to participate in the experiment. Data of the control treatment was collected
from three sessions of the experiment by Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013), which was
conducted in April 2012. A total of 45 subjects participated in these 3 sessions of
experiment and the average payment was $17.38. Three session of the information
treatment were conducted in April 2013, with the total participation of 45 subjects. The
average payment for the last three sessions was $15.72. Table 8 presents the descriptive
statistics for all six sessions of the experiment. There are 2700 observations at the
subject-round level. The average donor registration rate for all sessions is 30.7%, while
the average payment is $16.55. Among all selected subjects, 47.8% of them were self-

26

The experiment was conducted on computers using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fischbacher, 2007).
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reported as organ donors in real life, and 22.2% requested a flier containing additional
information about organ donation at the end of the experiment.

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Round Profit

2700

8.546

9.338

-3

78

Payment

2700

16.550

7.103

7

34

Donor Registration Rate

2700

0.307

0.461

0

1

Real Life Donors

2700

0.478

0.500

0

1

Organ Donation Fliers

2700

0.222

0.416

0

1

White

2700

0.200

0.400

0

1

Male

2700

0.422

0.494

0

1

I conducted a series of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to compare donation decisions of
subjects across treatments. Table 9 illustrates the summary statistics across treatments
and the results from the tests. The results are reported according to four different data
partitions. The first pools the data across all rounds. The second partition focuses on the
first 10 rounds of the experiment, the third one focuses on round 11-20, while the forth
one focuses on the last 10 rounds. The average registration rate across all rounds is
29.26% for the control treatment and 32.15% for the information treatment. The
difference in registration rates across treatment is not statistically significant. Over the
first 10 rounds, the average registration rate is 38.89% for the control treatment, which is
higher than the 30.44% rate in the control treatment. This result is statistically
significant. However, this behavioral difference across treatments decreases as subjects
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played more rounds. One explanation could be subjects in the control treatment collected
information about the game through playing multiple rounds, including the additional
earnings a subject earned after he was saved by a donated organ. Whether or not
providing this information creates no difference across treatments, as subjects have
learned the information voluntarily.

Table 9. Percent Choosing to be a Donor within the Experiment
Pooled Data
Rounds 1-10
Rounds 11-20
Obs Percent (SD)
Percent (SD)
Percent (SD)
Control treatment

Rounds 21-30
Percent (SD)

Session 1

450

23.11(42.20)

26.67(44.37)

23.33(42.44)

19.33(39.62)

Session 2

450

35.33(47.85)

34.00(47.53)

38.67(48.86)

33.33(47.30)

Session 3

450

29.33(45.58)

30.67(46.27)

28.00(45.05)

29.33(45.68)

1350 29.26(45.51)

30.44(46.07)

30.00(45.88)

27.33(44.62)

Total

Information treatment
Session 4

450

27.11(44.50)

31.33(46.54)

28.00(45.05)

22.00(41.56)

Session 5

450

20.22(40.21)

28.67(45.37)

19.33(39.62)

12.67(33.37)

Session 6

450

49.11(50.05)

56.67(49.72)

56.00(49.80)

34.67(47.75)

1350 32.15(46.72)

38.89(48.80)

34.44(47.57)

23.11(42.20)

-2.600(0.0078)

-1.426(0.1539)

1.458(0.1450)

Total

Across treatment comparisons
Rank-sum test (p-value)
Total
-1.627 (0.1038)

Since there are not clear results from the non-parametric tests showing that
subjects behaved differently across treatments in the experiment, I further conducted a
series of probit regressions with additional controls to investigate the marginal effect of
the persuasive message on donation decisions. The results of regressions with standard
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errors clustered by individual are illustrated in Table 10. The reference group of the
regressions is donation decision in the control treatment and the independent variables
include a treatment dummy variable Information. Regression Model 1 controls for round
information and its interaction term. Since subjects experienced a break between round
15 and 16, I also control whether a decision is made in the first 15 rounds or in the last 15
rounds of the experiment in Model 1. The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1
if a treatment is played in the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the treatment
dummy. Regression Model 2 additionally controls for whether the subject is a registered
organ donor in real life using a dummy variable interaction term. The dummy variable
Real Life Donor equals to 1 if a subject was self-reported as a currently registered donor.
At the end of the experiment, we collected subjects’ preference toward information
regarding organ donation by asking whether they want to receive a flier containing
information about organ donation. Regression Model 3 includes a dummy variable Flier,
which equals to 1 if a subject was willing to receive the organ donation flier. I further
control the effect of information in the previous round on the current registration decision
(Model 4). Earnings_Last captures earnings from the previous round. Saved_Last is a
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the subject received an organ donated by others in
the previous round. SavedEarn_Last represents the additional earnings from the previous
round after receiving an organ. Lastly, regression Model 5 includes demographic control
variables Male and White.
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Table 10. Probit Regression on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment
Probit Estimation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.137**
0.214***
0.215***
0.217**
0.208**
Information
(0.036)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.014)
Round
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.003
(0.477)
(0.493)
(0.463)
(0.286)
(0.282)
Round×Info
-0.009**
-0.009**
-0.009**
-0.009**
-0.009**
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.024)
(0.040)
(0.039)
Second Treatment
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.009
0.009
(0.947)
(0.971)
(0.929)
(0.811)
(0.798)
Second×Info
0.049
0.050
0.049
0.051
0.050
(0.379)
(0.375)
(0.392)
(0.388)
(0.391)
Real Life Donor

0.163**
(0.030)
-0.155
(0.107)

RealDonor*Info

Flier

0.116
(0.148)
-0.127
(0.206)

0.121
(0.146)
-0.138
(0.172)

0.107
(0.200)
-0.126
(0.210)

0.152*
(0.054)

0.151*
(0.061)

0.147*
(0.063)

0.001
(0.299)
-0.013
(0.705)
0.006**
(0.015)

0.001
(0.299)
-0.012
(0.733)
0.006**
(0.021)

Earnings_Last
Saved_Last
SavedEarn_Last

Male

0.078
(0.182)
0.005
(0.944)

White

N
Chi2
Pseudo R2

2700
13.989
0.01

2700
18.843
0.023

2700
24.576
0.036

2610
45.25
0.043

2610
46.093
0.048

Note: All variables are expressed as marginal values. Clustered errors by individual (80 clusters). p-values in
parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
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The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as statistically significant in
early rounds of the experiment. Coefficients on Information and Round×Info in Model 1
indicate that the persuasive message made subjects about 13% more likely to register as a
donor in round 1 (p = 0.0446). The negative coefficient on Round×Info suggests that the
impact of the persuasive message decreases as subjects played more rounds. Regression
Model 1 also controls for whether a decision was made in the first fifteen rounds or in
last 15 rounds of the experiment. Coefficients on Second Treatment and Second×Info
suggest there is not restart effect after the break in either the control treatment or the
information treatment (p = 0.2208).
Subjects’ registration decisions in the organ-framed experiment are significantly
associated with their organ donation decisions in real life (Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013).
Regression Model 1 shows consistent findings that subjects who were self-reported as
organ donors in real life are 16% more likely to register as a donor in the experiment, and
the result is significant at the 5% level. The negative coefficient on interaction term
RealDonor×Info suggests the information treatment affects donation decisions mainly
among subjects who are not organ donors in real life (p = 0.0104), while the treatment
effect is very small for those who are self-reported organ donors (p = 0.6401). The
significant positive coefficient on Information indicates that the subjects who are nondonors in real life are about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1 of the
information treatment than the control treatment.
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The dummy variable Flier captures subjects’ preference toward information
regarding organ donation. 27 The positive coefficients on Flier indicate that people who
want to receive additional information about organ donation are about 15% more likely to
register as organ donors and the results are significant at the 10% level.
Regression Model 4 additionally controls for the effect of information in the
previous round on the donor registration decision. Although the payment procedure
applied in the experiment assumes subjects would make their decisions independently
across rounds, Subjects’ donation decision can be affected by the information about how
others have contributed (Sell and Wilson, 1991). Subjects might infer others’ donation
decision through information in the previous round (e.g. a subject may believe many
people are donating if he received an organ donated by others when he needed one). The
coefficient on SavedEarn_Last is positive and significant at 5% level, indicating that
subjects are more likely to donate if they remained active longer after receiving a donated
organ in previous round. This finding supports our early prediction that subjects learned
information about the additional earnings a subject earned after he was saved by a
donated organ through playing the game, causing the elimination of treatment effects as
subjects played more rounds.
Regression Model 5 controls for demographic information of subjects. I did not
find any behavioral difference across either gender or ethnicity. Among all selected
subjects, whites or males are just as likely to donate as their counterparts (p = 0.916).

27

There were more subjects asked for fliers in the control treatment (27%) than in the information treatment (18%).
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Conclusion
The shortage in transplantable organs is a large concern for the American society.
Although the national registration rate has been slowly increasing over the past 30 years,
the gap between the number of transplantable organs and the number of waiting list
patients is still widening. Future changes in public policy may be required to increase
organ donations within the United States and prevent deaths from organ shortage.
This paper provides a proposal to increase donor registry by adding a persuasive
message with the registration request. I designed an experiment to investigate the effect
of providing a persuasive message when appealing for organ donation on the registration
rate. The results indicate that the persuasive message has a positive impact on donation
decisions in the early rounds of the experiment. The persuasive message makes subjects
about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1 of the information
treatment than the control treatment. I also find that subjects’ donation decisions in the
experiment are strongly associated with their real-life organ donor status and providing a
persuasive message affects donation decisions within the experiment mainly among
subjects who are self-reported as non-donors in real life. These findings can enter the
literature on studying the effect of persuasive messages on charity giving. It suggests that
providing persuasive messages with charity appeals could improve donation. This
finding also provides evidence that education about organ donation information promotes
the intent to donate and supports the efficiency of educational intervention.
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It is worth noting that there are many other proposals to increase the number of
registered donors. Drawing from the experiences in several European countries, the
proposal to change the default option of donor registry has arisen. It proposes to switch
the current opt-in system ― in which the default choice is non-donor and individuals
must register to be an organ donor ― to an opt-out system where individuals are
presumed to have consented to being an organ donor unless the person explicitly states
that he does not wish to. The opt-out system is currently adopted by several European
countries with high donor registration rates, such as Spain, Austria etc. The effectiveness
of the opt-out system has been empirically evidenced (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003,
2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013).
Another highly publicized proposal is to change the organ allocation rule by
providing priority to those waiting list patients who have previously registered as organ
donors. The priority rule is currently adopted by Israel and Singapore (combined with an
opt-out registration system), and its effectiveness on registration rate has been
theoretically and experimentally studied by Kessler and Roth (2012, 2013). Li, Hawley
and Schnier (2013) complement Kessler and Roth (2012) by further studying the relative
effectiveness of alternatives across different default options and organ allocation rules.
Their results are consistent with Kessler and Roth (2012) that the priority rule has a
positive impact on the donor registration rate. They additionally find that the priority rule
outperforms the opt-out program, while the combination of two policies (Singapore’s
system) generates the largest increase in the number of registered donors relative to an
opt-in only program (the U.S. system).
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Although the effectiveness of these other proposals has been evidenced,
implementing it may involve a long-term legislative transition and discussions about the
ethics surrounding this issue. For example, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968
(UAGA) makes an individual’s wish to register as an organ donor legally binding under
the current “opt-in” system. In contrast, a donor registry under an “opt-out” system is a
passive choice, which does not provide legal clarity of the deceased’s intent. Changing
the default of donor registry might calls for potential change in the gift laws to address
such legal concerns. On the other hand, the proposal to change the allocation rule
involves substantial debate about whether non-medical criteria should be brought in for
organ allocation. The paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of the message
proposal, which may complement other proposals during the transition period.
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Appendix A: Instructions for Chapter I Experiment
Instructions (Treatment 1)
No Talking Allowed
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making. In this experiment, you
will interact with another person, whose identity will remain unknown during and after
the experiment. We kindly ask you not to talk or communicate with any other participant.
If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and
the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.
Randomly Matched
You will be randomly paired with another participant once the experiment has begun.
You and your counterpart will be randomly assigned to a role of either decision-maker 1
or decision-maker 2. Suppose you are decision-maker 1, you would receive an
information screen on your computer that says “You are decision-maker 1.” Your final
payoff in this experiment will be determined by decisions made by you and your
counterpart.
Game Tree
You and your counterpart are going to play a game like
the decision tree pictured on the right. In the tree you
see four circles where “branches” of the tree meet.
These circles are the nodes of the decision tree.
Notice that all circles have either a number or a letter
in them. The number or letter identifies the owner of
that node. The circle with the number 1 indicates that
decision-maker 1 owns that node. Decision-maker 1 will have to take one of the paths
from that node. The two nodes with the number 2 are owned by decision-maker 2. The
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node with the letter N is owned by nature. More instructions are coming on what
determines nature’s move.
Each node is followed by two paths. Decision-maker 1 will make a choice between paths
“Exit” and “Engage”, and decision-maker 2 will make a choice between paths “Defect”
and “Cooperate”. Nature moves either “Left” or “Right”.
Based on decision-makers’ choices and nature’s move, one of the “ends” of the tree will
be reached. These ends are the U.S. $ payoffs that each decision-maker will receive. The
top number is the U.S. $ payoff for decision-maker 1, and the bottom number is the U.S.
$ payoff for decision-maker 2. For example, if decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”,
nature moves “Left”, and decision-maker 2 chooses “Defect”, then decision-make 1 will
receive a payoff of U.S. $0 and decision-make 2 will receive a payoff of U.S. $30.
It is clear in the game tree that if decision-maker 1 chooses “Exit”, the total $ payoff for
both decision-makers is $20(= $10 + $10). If decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, the
total $ payoff for both decision-makers is conditional on nature’s move. When nature
moves “Left”, the total $ payoff is $30(= $0 + $30 or $15 + $15); while when nature
moves “Right”, the total $ payoff is $50(= $15 + $35 or $25 + $25).
Simultaneous Decisions
Decision-makers make choices without observing the choices of their counterparts, so
decision-maker 2 would have to make choices based on the assumption that the paired
decision-maker 1 has chosen “Engage”. Suppose you are decision-maker 2, your choice
will only determine the final payoff if your counterpart actually chooses “Engage”. If
your counterpart actually chooses “Exit”, both of you will receive a payoff of U.S. $10
despite your choice.
Decision-makers also make choices without observing nature’s move, so decision-maker
2 would have to make choices for both possible moves of nature. Suppose you are
decision-maker 2, you would see the screen on your computer say “Suppose your
counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves LEFT. Please choose the path you
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want” and “Suppose your counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves RIGHT.
Please choose the path you want”.
Nature’s Move
The experimenter is going to flip a coin in front of every participant to determine nature’s
move, so there is a 50% probability for each of nature’s possible moves. However, what
“heads” and “tails” represent is private information for only decision-maker 2. In other
words, decision-maker 1 eventually will not receive information about nature’s move.
One-shot Game
You and your counterpart will only play this decision game ONCE.
Counterpart’s Choice
After submitting decisions, each decision-maker will receive information about his or her
own payoff. Decision-maker 2 will also receive information about nature’s move and his
or her counterpart’s choice.
Decision-maker 1 will NOT receive information about his or her counterpart’s choice,
unless it is revealed by decision-maker 1’s own payoff. However, since decision-maker 1
will not observe nature’s move, he or she will not be able to infer his or her counterpart’s
choice all the time. For example, suppose you are decision-maker 1. If you receive a
payoff of $0, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Defect”. If you receive a
payoff of $25, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Cooperate”. However, if
you receive a payoff of $15, you are NOT able to infer your counterpart’s choice.
Noteworthy Feature of the Game Tree
To reiterate, if decision-maker 1 receives a payoff of $15 from the game, he or she will
NOT be able to figure out whether decision-maker 2 chose “Cooperate” or “Defect”.
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Show-up Fees
You have already earned U.S. $5 for arriving to the experiment on time. It will be paid to
you in cash with your payoff from the game at the end of the experiment.
Complete Privacy
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other
subjects nor anyone else will ever be able to link your name or other identifying
information to your decision. This is accomplished by the following procedure. You have
received a key contained in a sealed envelope when you walked in the room. Your
identifying mark in this experiment is the number on your key which is known only by
you and which you will enter by yourself in the computer. After you finish the decisionmaking game, you will collect your money payoff contained in a sealed envelope, from a
mailbox that only you can open with your key. Your privacy is guaranteed because
neither your name nor your student ID number will be entered in your computer or
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.
At the end of the experiment, you will walk one by one to the hallway where the
mailboxes are to collect your money payoff envelope. The key and mailbox are labeled
with the same number. But you will be the only person having that key and the only one
who knows your key number. While collecting the envelope from your mailbox, you are
kindly requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building.
After collecting the envelope, you must return your key by throwing it in a key-return
box in the hallway.
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Instructions (Treatment 2)
No Talking Allowed
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making. In this experiment, you
will interact with another person, whose identity will remain unknown during and after
the experiment. We kindly ask you not to talk or communicate with any other participant.
If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and
the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.
Randomly Matched
You will be randomly paired with another participant once the experiment has begun.
You and your counterpart will be randomly assigned to a role of either decision-maker 1
or decision-maker 2. Suppose you are decision-maker 1, you would receive an
information screen on your computer that says “You are decision-maker 1.” Your final
payoff in this experiment will be determined by decisions made by you and your
counterpart.
Game Tree
You and your counterpart are going to play a game
like the decision tree pictured on the right. In the tree
you see four circles where “branches” of the tree
meet. These circles are the nodes of the decision tree.
Notice that all circles have either a number or a letter
in them. The number or letter identifies the owner of
that node. The circle with the number 1 indicates that
decision-maker 1 owns that node. Decision-maker 1
will have to take one of the paths from that node. The two nodes with the number 2 are
owned by decision-maker 2. The node with the letter N is owned by nature. More
instructions are coming on what determines nature’s move.
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Each node is followed by two paths. Decision-maker 1 will make a choice between paths
“Exit” and “Engage”, and decision-maker 2 will make a choice between paths “Defect”
and “Cooperate”. Nature moves either “Left” or “Right”.
Based on decision-makers’ choices and nature’s move, one of the “ends” of the tree will
be reached. These ends are the U.S. $ payoffs that each decision-maker will receive. The
top number is the U.S. $ payoff for decision-maker 1, and the bottom number is the U.S.
$ payoff for decision-maker 2. For example, if decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”,
nature moves “Left”, and decision-maker 2 chooses “Defect”, then decision-make 1 will
receive a payoff of U.S. $0 and decision-make 2 will receive a payoff of U.S. $30.
It is clear in the game tree that if decision-maker 1 chooses “Exit”, the total $ payoff for
both decision-makers is $20(= $10+$10). If decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, the total
$ payoff for both decision-makers is conditional on nature’s move. When nature moves
“Left”, the total $ payoff is $30(= $0 + $30 or $15 + $15); while when nature moves
“Right”, the total $ payoff is $50(= $15 + $35 or $25 + $25).
Simultaneous Decisions
Decision-makers make choices without observing the choices of their counterparts, so
decision-maker 2 would have to make choices based on the assumption that the paired
decision-maker 1 has chosen “Engage”. Suppose you are decision-maker 2, your choice
will only determinate the final payoff if your counterpart actually chooses “Engage”. If
your counterpart actually chooses “Exit”, both of you will receive a payoff of U.S. $10
despite your choice.
Decision-makers also make choices without observing nature’s move, so decision-maker
2 would have to make choices for both possible moves of nature. Suppose you are
decision-maker 2, you would see the screen on your computer say “Suppose your
counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves LEFT. Please choose the path you
want.” and “Suppose your counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves RIGHT.
Please choose the path you want.”
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Nature’s Move
The experimenter is going to flip a coin in front of every participant to determine nature’s
move, so there is a 50% probability for each of nature’s possible moves. Both decisionmakers will receive information about what “heads” and “tails” represent.
One-shot Game
You and your counterpart will only play this decision game ONCE.
Counterpart’s Choice
After submitting decisions, each decision-maker will receive information about nature’s
move and his or her own payoffs. Decision-maker 2 will also receive information about
his or her counterpart’s choice.
Decision-maker 1 will NOT receive information about his or her counterpart’s choice.
However, the counterpart’s choice can be revealed by nature’s move and his or her own
payoff. For example, suppose you are decision-maker 1. If you know that nature moves
left and you receive a payoff of $15, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen
“Cooperate”. On the other hand, if you know that nature moves right and you receive a
payoff of $15, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Defect”.
Noteworthy Feature of the Game Tree
To reiterate, if decision-maker 1 receives a payoff of $15 from the game, he or she will
be able to figure out whether decision-maker 2 chose “Cooperate” or “Defect”.
Show-up Fees
You have already earned U.S. $5 for arriving to the experiment on time. It will be paid to
you in cash with your payoff from the game at the end of the experiment.
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Complete Privacy
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other
subjects nor anyone else will ever be able to link your name or other identifying
information to your decision. This is accomplished by the following procedure. You have
received a key contained in a sealed envelope when you walked in the room. Your
identifying mark in this experiment is the number on your key which is known only by
you and which you will enter by yourself in the computer. After you finish the decisionmaking game, you will collect your money payoff contained in a sealed envelope, from a
mailbox that only you can open with your key. Your privacy is guaranteed because
neither your name nor your student ID number will be entered in your computer or
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.
At the end of the experiment, you will walk one by one to the hallway where the
mailboxes are to collect your money payoff envelope. The key and mailbox are labeled
with the same number. But you will be the only person having that key and the only one
who knows your key number. While collecting the envelope from your mailbox, you are
kindly requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building.
After collecting the envelope, you must return your key by throwing it in a key-return
box in the hallway.
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Appendix B: Parametric Tests of Chapter II Experiment
Given the complexity of the decision environment we elected to simulate the
decision environment to inform our parameterization of the experiment. The most
critical parameter in our experiment is the probability of organ failure. There are two
types of organ failure in our experiment. Subjects with an A organ failure potentially
provide transplantable organs for subjects with a B organ failure. The ratio of the
probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure should be high enough
to keep the scarcity of transplantable organs high, but it also cannot be too high because it
will cancel out the incentive to donate in the Priority treatment. Figure 6 shows the
expected payoff difference between donors and non-donors for different parameter values
in both the Control treatment and the Priority treatment (based on 100,000 simulations of
donation rate from 0% to 100% for each set of parameters). The parameter values vary
the ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure (Beta in
Figure 6).
Control Treatment

Priority Treatment

Figure 6. Simulations Payoff Difference between Being a Donor and a Non-donor
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In Figure 6, the teal blue line represents the expected payoff difference with the
parameters actually used in the experiment (Beta = 2), consistent with those used by
Kessler and Roth (2012). In the Control treatment, being a donor is more costly that
being a non-donor, which would predict no donation in the game. Non-zero donation in
the Control treatment would be the expression of altruistic motivation. In the Priority
treatment, the payoff difference is increasing with the donation rate. It is worth noting
that once Beta exceeds two the payoff difference start to fall off again and the benefits of
being a donor are reduced. The reason for these results is an increase in Beta generates
an overwhelming gap between organ demand and supply. Due to the high odds of having
a B organ failure and the insufficient organ supply, the probability of dying while waiting
for a B organ increases even for donors who have priority on the waiting list. The
incentive to donate provided by priority rule is canceled out, since having priority on the
waiting list does not generate benefit any more.
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Appendix C: Instructions for Chapter II Experiment
Instructions (Opt-in Treatment)
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in
the experiment today will affect your real life.
Show-up Fee
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time.
Experiment
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money.
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20%
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to
participate in that round.
Waiting List
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of
time that one has been waiting on the list. Those who have been waiting longer are
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ranked higher. Ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly determined.
For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been waiting for 4
periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule, person 1 ranks
higher than person 2 on the list. If there were an active B organ donated, it would go to
person 1 before person 2.
Earnings of Each Round
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round.
Organ Donation Decision and Cost
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B
organ and increase their earnings in that round. If you want to change your status, you
must register yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the
box empty. Please note that the organ donor registration (checking the box) will cost you
$0.75. This registration cost will be charged whether or not you actually become a donor.
If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if
donation actually takes place. The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by
recipients.
Final Payoff
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your
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decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds. If in this selected
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged
from your show-up fee.

Instructions (Opt-out Treatment)
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in
the experiment today will affect your real life.
Show-up Fee
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time.
Experiment
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money.
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20%
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to
participate in that round.
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Waiting List
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by two criteria: first
one’s donation decision, and second the length of time that one has been waiting on the
list. If you are an organ donor, you will be given priority in ranking on the waiting list.
Donors are ranked higher than the non-donors. Individuals with the same donation
decision will be ranked according to the length of time they have been waiting. Those
waiting longer are ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are
randomly determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1
is an unregistered donor who has been waiting for 4 periods and person 2 is a registered
donor who has been waiting for 3 periods. Person 2 will rank higher than person 1. If
there were an active B organ donated, it would go to person 2 before person 1.
To reiterate, if you are not a donor, you will be ranked behind donors on the waiting list.
Earnings of Each Round
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round.
Organ Donation Decision and Cost
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B
organ and increase their earnings in that round. If you want to change your status, you
must register yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the
box empty. Please note that the organ donor registration (checking the box) will cost you
$0.75. This registration cost will be charged whether or not you actually become a donor.
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If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if
donation actually takes place. The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by
recipients.
Final Payoff
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds. If in this selected
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged
from your show-up fee.

Instructions (Priority Treatment)
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in
the experiment today will affect your real life.
Show-up Fee
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time.
Experiment
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money.
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In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20%
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to
participate in that round.
Waiting List
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by two criteria: first
one’s donation decision, and second the length of time that one has been waiting on the
list. If you are an organ donor, you will be given priority in ranking on the waiting list.
Donors are ranked higher than the non-donors. Individuals with the same donation
decision will be ranked according to the length of time they have been waiting. Those
waiting longer are ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are
randomly determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1
is an unregistered donor who has been waiting for 4 periods and person 2 is a registered
donor who has been waiting for 3 periods. Person 2 will rank higher than person 1. If
there were an active B organ donated, it would go to person 2 before person 1.
To reiterate, if you are not a donor, you will be ranked behind donors on the waiting list.
Earnings of Each Round
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round.
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Organ Donation Decision and Cost
At the beginning of each round, you begin by being an organ donor. You will be asked to
declare whether you want to change your status and become a non-donor in that round.
Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B organ and
increase their earnings in that round. However, if you want to change your status, you
must withdraw yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the
box empty. Please note that the decision to withdrawal from being an organ donor
(checking the box) will cost you $0.75.
If you keep your status as an organ donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs
will be donated to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list.
Please note that the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be
charged if donation actually takes place. The organs you donated cannot be re-donated
by recipients.
Final Payoff
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds. If in this selected
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged
from your show-up fee.

Instructions (Opt-out with Priority Treatment)
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
approach you and answer your question in private.
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Show-up Fee
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time.
Experiment
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. At the beginning of each round, you
will be assigned with three tokens: one A token and two B tokens. Each round of the
experiment consists of a finite number of periods in which you can potentially earn more
money.
In each period of any round, it is possible that you will lose your tokens. There is a 10%
probability of losing an A token and 20% probability of losing both B tokens (both B
tokens will be lost the same time). You will not lose both types of tokens at the same
time. Whenever you lose an A token in a round, you will cease to participate in that
round. Whenever you lose both B tokens in a round, you will be placed on a waiting list
to receive a B token donated by others. You may remain on the waiting list for up to 5
periods. If you do not receive one B token within the 5 periods, you will cease to
participate in that round.
Waiting List
If you lose your B tokens, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one donated by
others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of time
that one has been waiting on the list, and the ones who have been waiting longer are
ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly
determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been
waiting for 4 periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule,
person 1 ranks higher than person 2 on the list. Whenever there is an available B token, it
will go to person 1 before person 2.
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Earnings of Each Round
You will earn $3 in each period in which you have one A token and at least one B token.
Please note that you will not earn any money in a period in which you are on the waiting
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round (i.e., do not have at least one
active B token).
Donation Decision and Cost
At the beginning of each round, you will be asked to declare whether you want to donate
your B tokens after you lost your A token. Donating may potentially increase other’s
earnings in that round. If you want to donate your B tokens, you must register yourself as
a donor by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the box empty.
Please note that the decision to register as a donor (checking the box) will cost you $0.75.
If you choose to be a donor and you lose your A token, your B tokens will be donated to
those who are on the waiting list in the order of their rank. Please note that the realized
donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if a donation
actually takes place. The tokens you donated cannot be re-donated by recipients.
Final Payoff

Your payoff in a round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds. If in this selected
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged
from your show-up fee.
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Appendix D: Instructions for Chapter III Experiment
Instructions (Information Treatment)
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in
the experiment today will affect your real life.
Show-up Fee
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time.
Experiment
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money.
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20%
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to
participate in that round.
Waiting List
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of
time that one has been waiting on the list. Those who have been waiting longer are
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ranked higher. Ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly determined.
For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been waiting for 4
periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule, person 1 ranks
higher than person 2 on the list. If there were an active B organ donated, it would go to
person 1 before person 2.
Earnings of Each Round
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round.
Organ Donation Decision and Cost
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B
organ and increase their earnings in that round.
According to the data collected from previous sessions of the same
experiment series, a subject who was saved by a donated organ
earned $10.18 more on average in each round, compared with the
average earnings of $18.63 per subject per round.

If you want to change your status, you must register yourself by checking the box on your
screen; otherwise, you can leave the box empty. Please note that the organ donor
registration (checking the box) will cost you $0.75. This registration cost will be charged
whether or not you actually become a donor.
If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if
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donation actually takes place. The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by
recipients.
Final Payoff
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds. If in this selected
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged
from your show-up fee.
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